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The forth recommendation of symmetric block cipher mode of operation SP800-38D, 
Galois/Counter Mode of Operation (GCM) was developed by David A McGrew and John 
Viega. GCM uses an approved symmetric key block cipher with a block size of 128 bits and 
a universal hashing over a binary Galois field to provide confidentiality and authentication. It 
is built specifically to support very high data rates as it can take advantage of pipelining and 
parallel processing techniques.  
Before GCM, SP800-38A only provided confidentiality and SP800-38B provided 
authentication. SP800-38C provided confidentiality using the counter mode and 
authentication. However the authentication technique in SP800-38C was not parallelizable 
and slowed down the throughput of the cipher. Hence, none of these three recommendations 
were suitable for high speed network and computer system applications.  
With the advent of GCM, authenticated encryption at data rates of several Gbps is now 
practical, permitting high grade encryption and authentication on systems which previously 
could not be fully protected. However there have not yet been any published results on actual 
architectures for this standard based on FPGA technology. 
This thesis presents a fully pipelined and parallelized hardware architecture for AES-GCM 
which is GCM running under symmetric block cipher AES on a FPGA multi-core platform 
corresponding to the IPsec ESP data flow. 
The results from this thesis show that the round transformations of confidentiality and hash 
operations of authentication in AES-GCM can cooperate very efficiently within this 
pipelined architecture. Furthermore, this AES-GCM hardware architecture never 
unnecessarily stalls data pipelines. For the first time this thesis provides a complete FPGA-
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Since 2001, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has published a total 
of four recommendations for Block Cipher Modes of Operation, specifically SP800-38A[1], 
SP800-38B[21], SP800-38C[22], and SP800-38D[2]. A block cipher mode of operation is an 
algorithm that uses a symmetric key block cipher to provide confidentiality, authentication or 
both for information security.  
In SP800-38A, NIST recommends five confidentiality modes of operation for use with an 
underlying symmetric key block cipher algorithm: Electronic Codebook (ECB) mode, Cipher 
Block Chaining (CBC) mode, Cipher Feedback (CFB) mode, Output Feedback (OFB) mode, 
and Counter (CTR) mode. These five modes can be separated into two groups: one is a non-
feedback mode group, including ECB and CTR; one is a feedback mode group, including 
CBC, CFB and OFB. In the feedback modes, the current computation/execution step depends 
on the result of the previous step. Therefore, to implement these kinds of modes in hardware, 
an iterative architecture is typically adapted for low throughput requirements rather than a 
pipelined architecture. In contrast, the use of ECB or CTR mode, or non-feedback modes, 
supports pipelined or parallelized architecture designs for processing high-speed data flows. 
In SP800-38B, NIST recommends a message authentication code (MAC) algorithm that is 
based on a symmetric key block cipher. This cipher-based MAC is referred to as CMAC, or 
the Cipher Block Chaining MAC algorithm (CBC-MAC). 
In SP800-38C, NIST recommends a mode of operation, called CCM, based on an approved 
symmetric key block cipher algorithm whose block size is 128 bits. CCM provides the 
confidentiality and the authenticity of data by combining the techniques of the CTR mode 
and the CBC-MAC. 
 
  2
The throughput of the CTR mode implementation, which can be pipelined, is much larger 
than that of CBC-MAC implementation, which can not be parallelizable. Specifically, none 
of these three recommendations, SP800-38A, B, and C, can be adapted for high speed 
network and computer system applications. Therefore, there is a compelling need for a mode 
of operation which can not only efficiently provide confidentiality, but authentication at high 
speed. 
As the forth security standard of Block Cipher Mode of Operation, SP800-38D, 
Galois/Counter Mode of Operation (GCM), fills the need above. GCM features the use of an 
approved symmetric key block cipher with a block size of 128 bits and a universal hash 
function that is defined over a binary Galois field. The most recently approved symmetric 
key block cipher with a block size of 128 bits is the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) 
algorithm that is specified in Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) Pub.197 [3]. 
The specified universal hash function in GCM is defined over a binary Galois field (GF) and 
is a 128-bit polynomial multiplier over GF (2128), called GHASH. GHASH can provide a 
secure, parallelizable, and efficient authentication mechanism. For the confidentiality 
mechanism of GCM, the CTR mode embedded by ECB mode, called GCTR, is adopted 
using an underlying block cipher. GCM, i.e. SP800-38D, was officially published in April 
2006. However there are no known FPGA (field programmable gate array) architectures or 
implementations of this standard. 
1.2 Work Objective 
The motivation behind this thesis is to demonstrate and analyze GCM’s practical 
performance and area cost by implementing it on a realistic hardware platform. In the rest of 
this thesis, AES-GCM will refer to GCM with AES as the symmetric block cipher. 
Presented in this thesis are the hardware architectures for AES-GCM, including iterative-
AES module, pipelined-AES module, GHASH module, and Key-expanded module.  These 
GCM elements are then integrated together along with control logic to implement the entire 
new security standard, AES-GCM. 
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To verify the feasibility, efficiency and cost of each hardware module in AES-GCM, AES-
GCM has been demonstrated using an advanced multi-core FPGA. The architectural design 
was synthesized, timing simulated, and downloaded to the FPGA prototype platform. 
1.3 Thesis Organization 
This thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 gives an overview of the mathematical 
definitions over GF and confidentiality mode of operation concepts used in AES-GCM. This 
chapter also provides an introduction to the FPGA device structures and the FPGA prototype 
platform system used to create AES-GCM. Chapter 3 presents security standards, AES, and 
GCM. In chapter 4, the proposed hardware architectures of AES-GCM are presented. The bit 
parallel multiplier over GF, and the pipelined AES discussed in chapter 2 and 3 are chosen as 
the modules to build AES-GCM. A methodology, discussed in chapter 4, to verify the AES-
GCM hardware implementation is established relying on the prototype platform. Finally, 







This chapter provides the concepts necessary in order to understand GCM: Section 2.1 
introduces to the concepts of finite fields, and the polynomial multiplier over binary finite 
fields followed by a discussion of its different implementation architectures. Section 2.2 is a 
description of ECB and CTR modes of operation which are the core of confidentiality of 
AES-GCM. Section 2.3 is an overview of FPGA technology and the multi-core FPGA 
prototype platform used to implement AES-GCM in this thesis. 
2.1 Mathematical Background 
The fundamentals of AES and GHASH are based on operations over the finite field. This 
section provides an introduction to these operations. The concepts and methods have been 
gathered from [4], [5], and [6]. 
2.1.1 Finite Fields 
A field can be considered as a set whose elements form a group G under two operations: 
multiplication indicated by symbol “·” and addition indicated by symbol “+”. These 
operations obey the basic algebraic properties. The relative finite field concepts are list as 
follows: 
Concept 1. (F, + , ·) is a field if the following properties hold: 
• The elements of F form a group under addition. 
• The non-zero elements of F form a group under multiplication. 
• The addition and multiplication operations are commutative, i.e.x + y = y + x and 
xy = yx for all x, y ∈ F. 
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• The multiplication operation can be distributed through the addition operation, i.e. 
x· (y + x) = x·y + x·z for all x, y, and z ∈ F. 
Concept 2. A field F with a finite number of elements is a finite field. 
Concept 3. A non-zero element of a finite field F is said to be a primitive element or 
generator of F if its powers cover all nonzero field elements. 
Concept 4. A unique finite field exists for every prime number. These fields are denoted 
GF(pm) where p is prime and m is a positive integer. One kind of field which is commonly 
used in cryptography applications is the binary finite fields GF(2m) where m is a large 
integer. 
Concept 5. A basis for GF (2m) over GF(2) is a set of m linearly independent elements of 
GF(2m). Any element of GF(2m) can be represented as an algebraic sum of the basis 
elements. 
The binary field GF(2m) contains 2m elements. Each element is represented by the selected 
basis. The most common representation is based on polynomial basis. With the polynomial 
basis α = {1, α, α2, …, αm-1}, the elements of GF (2m) can be represented as polynomial of 
degree m-1 as follows: 
GF(2m) ={A|A= a0 + a1α +· · · + am−1αm−1, where aj ∈GF(2), 0 ≤ j ≤ m-1} 
where α is the root of any irreducible polynomial F(x) of degree m over GF(2).  
Let 
F(x) = 1 + f1x + f2x2 + · · · + fm−1xm−1 + xm
where fi ∈GF(2), 0 ≤ i ≤ m-1. The irreducible polynomial F(x) is often referred to as the 
field polynomial. The arithmetic in AES-GCM is based on polynomial basis and uses the 
polynomial F(x) = 1 +x + x2 + x7 + x128 as field polynomial. 
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2.1.2 Operations over Binary Finite Fields GF (2m) 
Both operations, field addition and field multiplication, map a pair of field elements A and B 
onto another field element C, all A, B, and C ∈GF(2m). The following introduction on field 
addition and multiplication is based on polynomial basis. The field elements A, B, and C are 
the following polynomials, respectively: 
A(α) = a0+a1 α +· · ·+am−1 α m−1
B(α) = b0+b1 α +· · ·+bm−1 α m−1 
C(α) = c0+c1 α +· · ·+cm−1 α m−1. 
2.1.2.1 Field Addition 
Over a finite field GF(2m), a field addition of two elements A and B consists of adding the 
two polynomials together. Because the coefficients in A and B are over GF(2) and each pair 
of  coefficients are added independently, their sum C is written as 





+=+= αααα    (1) 
The pair of coefficients addition ai + bi in (1) is performed modulo 2 and translated to an 
exclusive- OR (XOR) operation in FPGA technology. That is to say that the field addition in 
(1) is computed by an m-bit XOR operation and does not require a carry chain. 
2.1.2.2 Field Multiplication 
Field multiplication over a finite field GF(2m) is executed by straightforward multiplying two 
polynomials A(α) and B(α), then dividing the resulting 2m-bit polynomial by F(α); the m-bit 
remainder is the result C(α). The product C of field elements A and B is expressed as 

























Commonly, people implement field multiplication in three methods with various efficiencies: 
Bit Serial multiplier, Bit Parallel multiplier and Digital Serial multiplier. In the following 
sections, the corresponding Algorithms to these three multipliers are presented. 
2.1.2.2.1 Bit Serial Multiplier 
By expanding B(α) and distributing A(α) to B(α)’s terms in (2), C(α) changes to 
C(α) = bm−1αm−1A(α) + · · · + b1αA(α) + b0A(α) mod F(α). 
By repeatedly grouping and factoring out α, C(α) changes further to 
C(α) = (· · · (((A(α)bm−1)α + A(α)bm−2)α + · · · + A(α)b1)α + A(α)b0)  mod F(α)     (3) 
Starting with the inner most parentheses and moving out, Algorithm 1 performs the 
operation iteratively to compute the right hand side of (3). This algorithm can be used to 
compute the product of A(α) and B(α) in bit-level. 
Algorithm 1 Bit-Serial Multiplication 
Input: A(α), B(α), and F(α) 
Output: C(α) = A(α) × B(α) mod F(α) 
1. C(α) ← 0 
2. for i = m − 1 downto 0 do 
3. C(α) ← αC(α) mod F(α) 
4. if (bi = 1) then 
5. C(α) ← C(α) + A(α). 
 
The Bit Serial multiplier is a direct implementation of Algorithm 1.  Totally 128 clock 
cycles are needed for calculating a multiplication over GF(2128) if A(α) can be loaded in 




Figure 1. Bit Serial Multiplier over GF(2m) 
2.1.2.2.2 Bit Parallel Multiplier 
Compared to the bit serial multiplier which needs m clock cycles to complete a multiplication 
over GF(2m), a bit parallel multiplier can complete computation in only 1 clock cycle over 
the same GF. (Because the circuit delays are very different between the bit serial multiplier 
and the bit parallel multiplier, the minimum clock period of clock for parallel multiplier is 
much larger than the minimum one for serial multiplier. i.e., 1 clock cycle computation time 
for parallel multiplier should be roughly equal to several or tens clock cycles computation 
time for serial multiplier.) A dedicated polynomial basis finite field bit parallel multiplier has 
been proposed in [6], called the Mastrovito multiplier. This multiplier is adapted to a fixed 
field polynomial F(α) . The implementation procedure of the Mastrovito multiplier is 
described as follows. 
First, rewrite polynomial elements A, B, and C in coefficient vector format as  
A= (a0, a1, · · ·, am−1),  
B= (b0, b1, · · ·, bm−1),  
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and C= (c0, c1, · · ·, cm−1). 
Similarly, let αiA=(( αiA)0, ( αiA)1, … , ( αiA)m-1). 
Then, rewrite the field multiplication equation (2) in matrix-vector form multiplication as 
follows: 







iicα 0 +b1 α +· · · + bm−1 α
 m−1) 
= ( A, Aα,Aα2, …, Aαm-1)⋅BT    (4) 
Equate the coefficients of αi, i=0, 1, …, m-1, on both sides of equation (4),  
c0 = (( A)0, ( αA)0, … , ( αm-1A)0) ⋅BT




cm-1 = (( A)m-1, ( αA)m-1, … , ( αm-1A)m-1) ⋅BT 
Thus,  
CT= (( A)T, ( αA)T, … , ( αm-1A)T) ⋅BT  (5) 
Let M denote the multiplication matrix (( A)T, ( αA)T, … , ( αm-1A)T), then (5) can be 
rewritten like below for short, 
CT=M ⋅BT   (6) 
Therefore, M is determinated by A and polynomial basis α = {1, α, α2, …, αm-1}. Given 
αiA, the coefficient vector of αi+1A mod F(α) can be computed as follows, αi+1A = α⋅αiA mod 
F(α). Obviously, the cost of generating αi+1A is the Hamming weight of F(α) – 2 XOR gates. 
The bit parallel serial multiplier is a direct implementation based on (5). Architecture of 
the Mastrovito multiplier is shown in Figure 2, which comprises of two parts, one is named f-
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network, and one is named IP-network. The f-network generates the multiplication matrix M, 
which contains XOR gates only. The IP-network performs the matrix-vector multiplication as 
shown in (6) and consists of m inner product modules, each of these product modules 
consists of m AND gates and m-1 XOR gates. 
 
Figure 2. Architecture of Bit Parallel Multiplier over GF(2m).[17] 
 
The bit parallel multiplier essentially unrolls the 128 loops of the bit serial multiplier; 
therefore, the area cost is 128 times of bit serial one. 
2.1.2.2.3 Digit Serial Multiplier 
A digit serial multiplier is a compromise between the serial and parallel methods and trades 
off circuit area against computation time. 
Let g be an integer less than m and let s = ⎡m/g⎤. Let B(α) to be separated into s pieces, 
each piece is organized in αigBi(α), where i and Bi(α) are defined like below, 
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Then the (3) can be rewritten 
C(α) = A(α) (α(s−1)gBs−1(α) + · · · + αgB1(α) + B0(α)) mod F(α) 
=(· · · ((A(α)Bs−1(α))αg + A(α)Bs−2(α))αg + · · · )αg + A(α)B0(α) mod F(α)      (7) 
Equation (7) can be computed using Algorithm 2. 
Algorithm 2 Digital-Serial Multiplication 
Input: A(α), B(α), and F(α) 
Output: C(α) = A(α)B(α) mod F(α) 
1. C(α) ← Bs−1(α)A(α) mod F(α); 
2. for k = s − 2 downto 0 do 
3. C(α) ← αgC(α); 
4. C(α) ← Bk(α)A(α) + C(α) mod F(α); 
 
The digital serial multiplier is implemented based on Algorithm 2. The multiplication is 
completed in ⎡m/g⎤  iterations which is g times faster than the bit serial multiplier, and 
requires fewer resources than the bit parallel multiplier. 
For more detailed description with respect to digital serial multiplier, please refer to [7] in 
which a digit serial multiplier is proposed based on look-up tables. 
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2.2 Confidentiality Mode of Operation Background 
Two modes of operation for Symmetric Key Block Ciphers, ECB and CTR, are selected to 
create the confidentiality in AES-GCM because they can admit pipelined, parallelized 
implementations and have minimal computational latency for high data rates. These modes 
are introduced below and more details can be obtained from [1]. 
2.2.1 Electronic Codebook Mode (ECB) 
The ECB mode is defined as follows and shown in Figure 3: 
ECB Encryption: Cj = CIPHK(Pj) for j = 1 … n, 
ECB Decryption: Pj = CIPH-1K(Cj) for j = 1 … n, 
where, CIPHK(Pj) is the forward cipher function of the block cipher algorithm, such as AES, 
under the key K applied to the plaintext Pj;  CIPH-1K(Cj) is the inverse cipher function of the 
block cipher algorithm under the key K applied to the ciphertext Cj. 
 
 




In ECB encryption and ECB decryption, multiple forward cipher functions and inverse 
cipher functions can be computed in parallel or pipeline. In the GCTR module of AES-GCM, 
ECB encryption block is embedded into a CTR block (see Figure 21). 
2.2.2 Counter Mode (CTR) 
The CTR mode is a confidentiality mode also that features the application of the block  
cipher to a set of input data groups, called counters, to produce a set of keystreams that are 
XORed with the plaintext to produce the ciphertext, and vice versa. The CTR mode is 
defined as follows and shown in Figure 4. 
 
CTR Encryption:  
Oj = CIPHK(Tj) for j = 1, 2 … n; 
Cj = Pj XOR Oj for j = 1, 2 … n-1; 
C*n = P*n XOR MSBu(On). 
 
CTR Decryption:  
Oj = CIPHK(Tj) for j = 1, 2 … n; 
Pj = Cj XOR Oj for j = 1, 2 … n-1; 
P*n = C*n XOR MSBu(On). 
The symbols used in the CTR encryption and decryption are:  
Tj----the counters for the jth input data group, 
Oj---- the key stream for the jth input data group, 
Pj ---- the jth plaintext group, 
Cj---- the jth ciphertext group. 
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C*n ----the last group of the ciphertext, which may be a partial group. 
P*n ----the last group of the plaintext, which may be a partial group. 
MSBu(On)---- the bit string consisting of the u most significant bits of the bit string On. 
In CTR encryption and CTR decryption, only the forward cipher function is invoked on 
each counter group, no inverse cipher function. The resulting key streams are XORed with 
the corresponding plaintext or ciphertext blocks to produce the ciphertext or plaintext blocks. 
For the last group, which may be a partial group of u bits, the most significant u bits of the 
last output group are used for the XOR operation; the remaining bits of the last output group 
are discarded. The forward cipher functions can be performed in parallel and pipelined. 
 
 
Figure 4. CTR Encryption and CTR Decryption [1] 
Both CTR encryption and CTR decryption are invoked in AES-GCM encryption and AES-
GCM decryption, respectively. 
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2.3 Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGA) 
The thesis presents the architecture of FPGA implementation of AES-GCM. The common 
implementation approaches are corresponding to three different technologies. They are: 
• Application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs) 
• Software-Programmed General Purpose CPU (SPGPC) 
• Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) 
ASICs are specifically designed for a fixed solution, and are thus very efficient. However, 
the circuit cannot be changed after fabrication. This requires a redesign of the chip if any 
modification needs to be done.  
SPGPCs are a flexible solution. CPUs execute a set of instructions to perform an 
algorithm. By changing the software code, the functionality of the system is altered without 
touching the hardware. But the SPCGPC’s efficiency is much lower than that of an ASIC. 
FPGAs offer a compromise between the ASIC and the SPGPC, achieving higher 
performance than software, while maintaining a higher level of flexibility than hardware. 
2.3.1 Advantages of FPGA in Cryptographic Applications 
The following attributes of the FPGA technology are particularly advantageous for 
cryptographic applications [8]. 
Algorithm Agility: More and more security applications intend to be algorithm 
independent and allow switching encryption algorithms on the flying. The encryption 
algorithm can be chosen through the negotiation made by two communication parties. 
Algorithm Upload: From a cryptographic point of view, algorithm upload can be 
necessary because a current algorithm is out of date or broken; a new algorithm is created. 
The security designer of the corresponding security company can upload the new bit streams 
of security standard to reconfigure FPGA device through the networks. 
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Throughput: Although FPGA implementations are typically slower than ASIC 
implementations, FPGA implementations are obviously faster than software 
implementations. In a cryptosystem, if a software solution is chosen for clients, then, a FPGA 
implementation should be adapted for servers in high-speed backbones. 
Cost Efficiency: The production costs of an ASIC are often too high for a small number of 
servers in security systems. Thus, the use of FPGAs is a common alternative. Furthermore, 
this is the one of reasons why the FPGA is chosen for security research in institutes and 
universities.  
Therefore, it is often best to choose an FPGA to implement cipher, such as AES-GCM 
standard. The CMC-FPGA-prototype-platform was chosen in this thesis for prototyping since 
it represents a generalized multi-core platform, appropriate for security applications. This 
FPGA platform will be discussed next. 
2.3.2 FPGA VirtexII pro xc2vp100 
A traditional FPGA is usually an integrated circuit consisting of 
• Configurable Logic Blocks (CLBs), 
• Input/Output Blocks (IOBs) and 
• Programmable routing resources. 
For Xilinx FPGA family VirtexII pro contains not only CLBs, IOBs, and memory arrays, 
but also it has IBM 400 MHz PowerPC™ processors and 622 Mbps to 6.25 Gbps full duplex 
serial MGT(multi-gigabit transceivers). More specifically, Table 1 shows all the main 














































xc2vp100 2 44096 1378 444 444 7992 12 1164 
 
2.3.2.1 Configurable Logic Blocks (CLBs) 
The CLBs in the VirtexII pro are comprised of both combinational and sequential logic. The 
combinational logic can be configured to become possible Boolean functions. Flip-Flops are 
provided to support sequential logic and can be utilized or bypassed depending on the 
configuration. 
One CLB has four slices. Each slice is identical and contains: 
• Two function generators F and G 
• Two storage elements 
• Arithmetic logic gates 
• multiplexers 
• Fast carry look-ahead chain 
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• Horizontal cascade chain 
A general slice structure of VirtexII pro is shown in Figure 5. The function generators F 
and G can be configured as 4-input look-up tables (LUTs), as 16-bit shift registers, or as 16-
bit distributed SelectRAM+ memory (to be discussed in section 2.3.2.2). The multiplexers, 
MUXF5 and MUXFX can provide any function of five, six, seven, or eight inputs when 
combined with function generators. The two storage elements can be configured either edge-
triggered flip-flops or level-sensitive latches. Each CLB has internal fast interconnect and 
connects to a switch matrix to access general routing resources.  
 
Figure 5. General Slice in Virtex-ll Pro [15] 
2.3.2.2 Distributed SelectRAM+ 
As described in section 2.3.2.1, the Virtex-II Pro family devices feature distributed 
SelectRAM modules which are implemented by using function generators of the CLB 
resource. Distributed SelectRAM memory writes synchronously and reads asynchronously. 
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However, a synchronous read can be implemented using the register that is available in the 
same slice. One LUT can be configured as a 16x1-bit RAM which is cascadable for a deeper 
and wider memory implementation. 
A primitive is a component in Xilinx software’s library, which is available for instantiation 
without the need for specifying a definition in HDL code. One CLB which include 8 LUTs 
can be used to form up to a 128x1-bit RAM module primitive (see Table 2). These primitives 
are actually Distributed SelectRAM modules. Two 16 x 1 RAM resources can be combined 
to form a dual-port 16 x 1 RAM with one dedicated read/write port and a second read-only 
port. One port writes into both 16 x1 RAMs simultaneously, but the second port reads 
independently. 
Table 2 shows the number of LUTs used in each distributed SelectRAM+ primitives. 
Table 2. Resources Used by Distributed Memory [15] 
Primitive name RAM Size Type # of LUTs 
16x1S 16x1 bits single port 1 
16x1D 16x1 bits dual port 2 
32x1S 32x1 bits single port 2 
32x1D 32x1 bits dual port 4 
64x1S 64x1 bits single port 4 
64x1D 64x1 bits dual port 8 
128x1S 128x1 bits single port 8 
 
 
For Single-port Distributed SelectRAM+ (see Figure 6), synchronous writes address lines 
WG[4:1] and asynchronous reads lines A[4:1] use the same shared address lines A[3:0] from 
the outside.  
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For Dual-port Distributed SelectRAM+ (see Figure 7), besides one LUT used in single-
port mode, the second LUT uses the same address lines A[3:0] for synchronous write and 
another set of address lines DPRA[3:0] are used for the second asynchronous read. 
 
 





Figure 7. Dual-Port Distributed SelectRAM+ [15] 
 
2.3.2.3 Block SelectRAM+ 
In addition to distributed memory, the Virtex-II Pro family devices include a large amount of 
18 Kb block SelectRAM+ (BRAM) resources, programmable from 16K x 1 bit to 512 x 36 
bit, in various depth and width configurations. These SelectRAM+ blocks are real dual-port 
RAM blocks which can be configured as FIFO easily. In the VirtexII pro xc2vp100, there are 
444 18 Kb SelectRAM+ blocks that make it totally 1MB block SelectRAM+, Table 3 shows 
the supported memory configurations for single-port and dual-port modes. 
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Table 3. Block SelectRAM Configuration Modes [15] 
16Kx1 bit 2Kx9 bits 
8Kx2 bits 1Kx18 bits 
4Kx4 bits 512x36 bits 
 
Each port in SelectRAM+ Blocks has the following inputs: Clock, Clock Enable, Write 
Enable, Set/Reset, Address, and separate Data and Parity buses for inputs and outputs. Both 
write and read operations are synchronous. 
As a single-port RAM, the block SelectRAM+ has access to the 18 Kb memory locations 
in any of the configurations in Table 3. Each block SelectRAM+ cell is a fully synchronous 
memory as illustrated in Figure 8. Input data bus and output data bus widths are identical. 
 
 
Figure 8. Block SelectRAM in Single-Port Mode [15] 
 
As a dual-port RAM, each port of block SelectRAM+ has access to a common 18 Kb 
memory resource. These are fully synchronous ports with independent control signals for 






Figure 9. Block SelectRAM in Dual-Port Mode[15] 
 
Since the SelectRAM+ blocks have a regular array structure, the place-and-route tools take 
advantage of this feature to achieve optimum system performance and fast compile times. 
[15].  
Distributed SelectedRAM+ and Block SelectedRAM+ are used for storage components in 
the AES-GCM implementation discussed in chapter 4. For example, the single port mode of  
the SelectedRAM+ or Block SelectedRAM+ is used to implement the S-box Look Up tables 
(see section 3.1.2); Also the dual port mode of  the SelectedRAM+ or Block SelectedRAM+ 
is used to implement a 11x128-bit FIFO. 
2.4 The CMC-Prototyping Platform 
The CMC-Prototyping Platform [13][14][16][24] is a prototype system provided by 
Canadian Microelectronics Corporation (CMC) to Canadian universities for research purpose 
only. It consists of: 
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• AMIRIX AP1000 PCI Platform FPGA Development Board 
• Xilinx Parallel-IV download cable kit and dual serial adaptor cable 
• IBM Intellistation Z Pro workstation 
• EDA tools for FPGA Development 
• AP1000 PCI Platform FPGA Development Kit Baseline Platform 
The major focus is the AP1000 FPGA Board. Figure 10 illustrates the AP1100 FPGA 
board hardware architecture. The DDR SDRAM banks provide 64-bit Data width for the two 
IBM PowerPC microprocessors which are the hardware IP cores inside the FPGA VirtexII 
pro xc2vp100. If the FPGA works in Base-line mode which is established by AMIRIX, all 
these memory blocks are controlled by the soft IP cores inside the FPGA. There are also 
synchronous SRAMs providing large data storage space. Configuration Flash, program Flash 
and System ACE are accessible through the local bus interface. The kernel driver is stored in 
program flash on the board. A ramdisk image is also stored in the program flash. By default, 
the AP1000 will load the kernel and mount the ramdisk when powered on. U-Boot which is 
stored in Program Flash is a bootloader program that provides the ability to load Linux, as 
well as a monitor program that allows access to the AP1000 resources. U-Boot is transferred 
to DDR-SDRAM memory for execution when it is selected to run. 
The Processor Bus Dual PCI Bridge provides an interface to other devices on the local PCI 
bus. Through this local PCI bus, FPGA Virtex-II Pro can communicate with host PC by a 
PCI-to-PCI bridge device. The FPGA also has access to a PMC module if installed and an 
Ethernet transceiver for network access. Furthermore, the extra high-speed network 
interfaces can be implemented through the two Gigabit Ethernet PHY devices that are 
connected directly to the Virtex-II Pro if the relative soft MAC layer IP cores are 
downloaded to FPGA.  
Expansion connectors are available through the Expansion I/O ports on the board. These 
expansion ports allow either cabling or custom PCB daughter cards to be directly connected 
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to the Virtex-II Pro. CompactFlash, Ethernet, and RS-232D connectors are accessible from 
outside the chassis. 
The Virtex-II pro can work in either of the two work modes on CMC-prototype platform, 
one is called Base-line mode which is supposed to be the default mode for applying the 
FPGA on board; one is called Stand-alone mode which is a fully custom mode. 
If the Virtex-II pro works in Base-line mode, approximately 93 % of the FPGA resources 
are free[24]. There are two internal buses inside it (see Figure 10), one is IBM Processor 
Local Bus (PLB), and one is IBM On-Chip Peripheral Bus (OPB). Two PowerPC CPU 
hardware IP cores and DDR-SDRAM Controller IP core are allocated on the 64-bit 80MHz 
PLB bus. Interrupt Controller and UART core are allocated on 32-bit 40MHz OPB bus. The 
PLB bus indirectly connects to the local PCI bus on the board; and the OPB bus also 
indirectly connects to the external local bus on the board. All these made IP cores above set 
up a System on a Chip (SoC) environment (i.e. so-called Base-line mode) for further 





Figure 10. AP1100 Board Architecture [24] 
If the Virtex-II pro works in Stand-alone mode, all the resources on the FPGA are free for 








In this chapter, the fundamental of  AES and GCM algorithms will be presented. Section 3.1 
introduces the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). Section 3.2 introduces the 
Galois/Counter Mode (GCM). 
3.1 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) 
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) was published by NIST in 2001. AES is a 
symmetric block cipher that operates on 128-bit block as input and output data. The 
algorithm can encrypt and decrypt blocks using a secret key which has a key size of 256-bit, 
192-bit, or 128-bit. One of the main features of AES is simplicity that is achieved by 
repeatedly combining substitution and permutation computations at different rounds. That is, 
AES encrypts/decrypts a 128-bit plaintext/ciphertext by repeatedly applying the same round 
transformation a number of times depending on the key size, see Table 4. 
Table 4.  Key-Block-Round Combinations [3] 




Number of Rounds 
AES-128 4 4 10 
AES-192 6 4 12 
AES-256 8 4 14 
 
The actual key size depends on the desired security level. Today, AES-128 is predominant 
and supported by most hardware implementations. In this section, the AES forward cipher 
operation (i.e. AES encryption) with 128-bit key is mainly discussed since it is invoked in the 
GCTR module of the AES-GCM standard to provide confidentiality. 
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3.1.1 AES Cipher 
For 128-bit key size, there are 10 rounds substitutions and permutations that have to be 
executed in AES cipher (see Table 4). The input 128-bit plaintext is presented in a 4x4 
matrix of bytes. Thus, there are 32 bits each row and each column in the matrix. This matrix 
is also called State array which is illustrated in Figure 11. In Figure 11, Si,j indicates a byte, 
where 0≤i,j ≤3. The state array is altered in each round. The input key is expanded into an 
array of forty four 32-bit words, and each 4 words of the expanded key will be used in each 
round. The key expansion should be done before the cipher operation. Each round 
transformation consists of four phases as follows: 






Figure 11. Illustration of State Array [3] 
 
SubBytes  The function SubBytes is the only non-linear function in AES. It substitutes all 
bytes of the state array using a LUT which is a 16x16 matrix of bytes, often called S-box. 
The S-box is used for SubBytes operation that contains the results of substitution and 
permutation of all possible 8-bit values. The content of the LUT can be computed by a finite-
 
  31
field inversion followed by an affine transformation over GF(2
8
). Each byte of state is 
mapped into a byte from the S-box; The 4 leftmost bits are used as the row index while the 4 
rightmost bits are used as the column index. Figure 12 illustrates the effect of the SubBytes 
transformation on the State array. The S-box is designed to be resistance to known 
cryptanalytic attacks [18].  SubBytes function has a property that the output cannot be 
described as a simple mathematical function of the input.  
In this thesis, two schemes to implement S-box are discussed, one based on Block 
SelectRAM+, and one based on Distributed SelectRAM+. 
 
 
Figure 12. Illustration of SubBytes Operation [3] 
 
ShiftRows  In the ShiftRows transformation, the bytes in the last three rows of the State 
are cyclically shifted over different numbers of bytes (see Figure 13). The first row is not 
shifted. The second row is left-shifted circularly one byte. For the third row, a 2-byte circular 
left shift is performed. For the forth row, a 3-byte circular left shift is performed. Since the 
MixColumns and AddRoundKey operations are done column by column, ShiftRows ensures 
that 4 bytes of one column are spread out to four different columns. Figure 13 illustrates the 





Figure 13.  Illustration of ShiftRows Transformation [3] 
 
MixColumns  MixColumns function operates on the state column by column. Each byte of 
a column in state array is mapped into a new value that is a function of all the four bytes in 



























































MixColumns operation ensures a good mixing among the bytes of each column [18]. 
ShiftRows and MixColumns together ensure that after executing the rounds all output bits 
depend on all input bits. 
AddRoundKey  AddRoundKey operation is designed as a stream cipher; all the 128 bits 
of state are XORed with 4 32-bit words  of expanded key resulting from key expansion. 
AddRoundKey is the only operation that involves using the key to ensure security. 
The AES with 128-bit key size forward cipher operation is shown in Figure 14. In Figure 
14, w[i,i+3] indicates 4 words of expanded key resulting from key expansion, where 0≤ i ≤ 




Figure 14.  AES Forward Cipher Operation (Pipelining Data Path) 
 
Decryption is a reverse of encryption which inverse round transformations to computes out 
the original plaintext of an encrypted ciphertext in reverse order. The round transformation of 
decryption uses the functions AddRoundKey, InvMixColumns, InvShiftRows, and 
InvSubBytes successively. AddRoundKey is its own inverse function because the XOR 
function is its own inverse. The round keys have to be selected in reverse order. 
InvMixColumns needs a different constant polynomial than Mix-Columns does. 
InvShiftRows rotates the bytes to the right instead of to the left. InvSubBytes reverses the S-
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Box look-up table by an inverse affine transformation followed by the same inversion over 
GF(28) which is used for encryption. About more details information of AES Decryption, 
refer to [3] and [18].  
3.1.2 Key Expansion 
The Key expansion operation takes the 128-bit key as the input for each session and yields a 
44 32-bit words expanded key array as its output. In each round, AES cipher uses 4 words of 
the 44-word expanded key in AddRoundKey transformation, like shown in Figures 14. 
Figure 15 is the illustration how to expand the Key. The first 4 words of the output array is 
nothing but the 16-byte input secret key. Except the words whose indexes are multiple of 
four, the other words are simply made by XORing the preceding word with the word four 
positions back. The words whose indexes are multiple of four go through a more complex 
function, called function g before XORing with the word four positions back. 
 
Figure 15.  Key Expansion [18] 
 
The function g takes the preceding word performs a one-byte circular left shift, then it 
performs SubBytes operation on each byte of the shifted result. In the last step it takes the 
substituted word and XORs it with a round constant hexadecimal word array “RC(i), 0, 0, 0”, 
where, 1≤ i ≤10. RC(i) is given in Table 5 in hexadecimal for each round. The purpose of 
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using round constants is to eliminate symmetries and similarities in making the 4-word 
expanded key for each round. 
Table 5.  Round Constant Bytes, RC in Hexadecimal [18] 
I (round 
number) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
RC(i) 01 02 04 08 10 20 40 80 1B 36 
 
3.2 Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) 
The elements of GCM and the associated notation and requirements are introduced in the 
three sections below. The block cipher and key are discussed in Sec. 3.2.1. The data elements 
of the authenticated encryption and authenticated decryption functions of GCM are discussed 
in Sec. 3.2.2. The types of application of GCM supposed in [2] are summarized in Sec. 3.2.3.  
The GHASH function, GCTR function and GCM specification are described in section 3.2.4, 
3.2.5 and 3.2.6, respectively. 
3.2.1 Block Cipher 
The AES-GCM standard depends on the symmetric key block cipher AES. The AES-GCM 
key is the block cipher key. The key shall be generated uniformly at random, or close to 
uniformly at random. The key should be established secretly among the parties to 
communicate. AES-GCM designates the encryption function of the block cipher AES as the 
forward cipher function denoted CIPHK which actually is AES in ECB mode (see Figure 21). 
GCM does not employ the inverse cipher function. 
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3.2.2 Input and Output Data 
GCM consists of the two functions that are called authenticated encryption and authenticated 
decryption. The requirements and notation for the input and output data of these functions are 
introduced in Section 3.2.2.1 and 3.2.2.2. 
3.2.2.1 Authenticated Encryption 
There are three input bit streams to the authenticated encryption operation: 
• A plaintext, denoted as P that can have up to239 bits; 
• Additional authenticated data (AAD), denoted as A that can have up to 264 bits; 
• An initialization vector denoted, as IV that can have up to 264 bits.  
In this thesis, a 96-bit IV is adopted for efficiency following the suggestion in [12]. 
GCM verifies the authenticity of both P and AAD; GCM also protects the confidentiality 
of P, while the AAD is transmitted in the clear. The IV is a nonce that is associated with the 
data to be against related attack. 
The following two bit strings comprise the output data of the authenticated encryption 
function: 
• A ciphertext, denoted C, with the same bit length as that of the plaintext. 
• An authentication tag, denoted T that have up to 128 bits. The T’s bit length is 
denoted as t. 
3.2.2.2 Authenticated Decryption 
The inputs to the authenticated decryption function are values for IV, A, C, and T, as 
described in Sec. 3.2.2.1 above. The output is one of the following: 
• The plaintext P that corresponds to the ciphertext C, or 
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• An indication that the inputs are not authentic, denoted as FAIL. 
GCM authenticated decryption computes the authentication tag T’ based on received data, 
and compares it with the received authentication tag T. If the two tags T and T’ are equal, 
then P will be the output of the authenticated decryption function. Otherwise, FAIL will be 
the output. 
3.2.3 Types of Applications of GCM 
There are four types of applications of GCM that are recommended in SP800-380D. They are 
1) GCM with an arbitrary length IV, 
2) GCM with the default IV, i.e. the length of the IV is restricted to exactly 96 bits. 
3) GMAC, i.e. the algorithm generates a stand-alone authentication tag T on the AAD with 
the arbitrary length IV. The plaintext P is the empty string. 
4) GMAC with the default IV. 
In the thesis, GCM with the default IV is chosen and will be discussed in Sec. 4. 
3.2.4 GHASH Function 
The authentication mechanism within GCM is based on the hash function, GHASH, that 
features multiplication by a fixed hash subkey, over a binary Galois field GF(2128). The hash 
subkey, denoted as H, is generated by applying the block cipher to the 128-bit “0” string. 
GHASH is a keyed hash function. Algorithm 3 below specifies the function that will be 
invoked within the AES-GCM authenticated encryption and authenticated decryption 
functions: 
Algorithm 3: GHASHH (X) 
Input: 
1. Bit string X with length len(X) = 128⋅m for some integer m. 
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1. Let X1, X 2, ... , X m-1, X m represents the unique sequence of blocks such that X= X 1 
|| X 2 || ... || X m-1 || X m. 
2. Let Y0 be the “zero block,” which means Y0 is a bit string comprised by 128 binary 0. 
3. For i = 1, ..., m, let Yi = (Yi-1⊕ Xi)⋅H. where “⋅” indicates multiplication over finite 
field as discussed in chapter 2.  
4. Return Ym. 
 
The GHASH function is illustrated in Figure 16 below. 
 
 




3.2.5 GCTR Function 
The mechanism for the confidentiality of GCM is a variation of the CTR mode (see section 
2.2.2.), called GCTR, with a particular incrementing function, denoted inc, for generating the 
necessary sequence of counter blocks. The first counter block for the plaintext encryption is 
generated by incrementing a block that is derived from IV. 
Algorithm 4 below specifies the GCTR function that will be invoked within the algorithms 
for the GCM authenticated encryption and authenticated decryption functions: 
Algorithm 4: GCTRK (ICB, X) 
Input: 
1. Bit string X, of arbitrary length; 
2. Initial counter block ICB, i.e. IV or some value generated from IV; 
3. Approved block cipher CIPH (such as AES) with a 128-bit block size; 
4. Key K; 
Output: 
Bit string Y of bit length len(X). 
Steps: 
1. Let n=⎡Len(X)/128⎤. 
2. Let X1, X2, ... , Xn-1, X*n denote the unique sequence of bit strings such that X = X 1 || 
X 2 ||... || X n-1 || X*n. 
3. Let CB1 = ICB. 
4. For i=2 to n, let CBi = inc(CBi-1). 
5. For i= 1 to n-1, let Yi=Xi ⊕ CIPHK(CBi). 
6. Let Y*n=X*n⊕MSBlen(X*n)(CIPHK(CBn)). 
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7. Let Y = Y 1 || Y 2 ||... || Y n-1 || Y* n. 
8. Return Y. 
Note: 
1. Len(X) indicates the bit length of the bit string X. 
2. Xi || Xi+1 indicates the concatenation of two bit strings Xi and Xi+1. 
3. LSBs (X) indicates the bit string consisting of the s right-most bits of the bit string X. 
4. MSBs (X) indicates the bit string consisting of the s left-most bits of the bit string X. 
5. Int(X) indicates the integer for which the bit string X is a binary representation. 
6. Inc(X) indicates the output of the GCM incrementing function applied to the block X, 
the more specifically, inc(X)=MSB96(X) ||[(int(LSB32(X))+1) mod 232]32.  
 
Figure 17 below illustrates the GCTR function. 
 
 




3.2.6 GCM Specification 
Algorithms for the authenticated encryption and authenticated decryption functions of GCM 
are specified in Section 3.2.6.1, and 3.2.6.2 below. The block cipher is AES (see section 3.1). 
3.2.6.1 Authenticated Encryption 
Algorithm 5 below performs the authenticated encryption function. 
Algorithm 5: AES-GCM-AEK (IV, P, A) 
Input: 
1. Block cipher CIPH (i.e. AES) with a 128-bit block size; 
2. Key K; 
3. Tag length t. 
4. Initialization vector IV; 
5. Plaintext P; 
6. Additional authenticated data A. 
Output: 
1. Cipher text C; 
2. Authentication tag T. 
Steps: 
1. Let H = CIPHK(0128) 
2. Define a block, J0, as follows: J0=IV||031l, i.e. J0 is a 128-bit string consisted of 96-bit 
IV, 31 ‘0’ bits, and1 ‘1’ bit. 
3. Let C = GCTRK(inc(J0), P). 
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4. Let u = 128⋅⎡len(C)/128⎤-len(C), and let v =128⋅⎡len(A)/128⎤-len(A) 
5. Define a block, S, as follows: S = GHASHH (A||0v||C||0u||[len(A)]64||[len(C)]64) 
6. Let T = MSBt(GCTRK(J0,S)). 
7. Return (C, T). 
Notes: 
1. [x]s indicates the binary representation of the non-negative integer x as a string of s 
bits, where x<2s. 
2. 0s denotes the string that consists of s ‘0’ bits. For example, 05 = B00000. 
The authenticated encryption function is illustrated in Figure 18 below. 
 
 




3.2.6.2 Authenticated Decryption 
Algorithm 6 below performs the authenticated decryption function. 
Algorithm 6: AES-GCM-ADK (IV, C, A, T) 
Input: 
1. Block cipher CIPH (i.e. AES) with a 128-bit block size; 
2. Key K; 
3. Tag length t. 
4. Initialization vector IV; 
5. Cipher text C; 
6. Additional authenticated data A. 
7. Authentication tag T. 
Output: 
Plaintext P or indication of inauthenticity FAIL; 
Steps: 
1. Let H = CIPHK(0128) 
2. Define a block, J0, as follows: J0=IV||031l. i.e. J0 is a 128-bit string consisted of 96-bit 
IV, 31 ‘0’ bits, and1 ‘1’ bit. 
3. Let P = GCTRK(inc(J0),C). 
4. Let u = 128⋅⎡len(C)/128⎤-len(C), and let v =128⋅⎡len(A)/128⎤-len(A) 
5. Define a block, S, as follows: S = GHASHH(A||0v||C||0u||[len(A)]64||[len(C)]64) 
6. Let T’= MSBt(GCTRK(J0,S)). 




The authenticated decryption function is illustrated in Figure 19 below. 
 





The Architecture of AES-GCM  
This chapter describes the AES-GCM implementation on the CMC-Prototype-Platform. 
Section 4.1 discusses the architectures of the modules of AES and GHASH, section 4.2 
discusses the architectures of the AES-GCM, including IPsec data packet, and GCM data 
flow. Section 4.3 discusses how to verify the AES-GCM functionality. 
4.1 Modules Design 
In AES-GCM encryption and AES-GCM decryption, AES and GHASH are the basic 
modules which are responsible for confidentiality and authentication, respectively.  In section 
4.1.1, an iterative AES and fully pipelined AES are presented; in section 4.1.2, a bit serial 
GHASH and a bit parallel GHASH are presented. The pipelined AES and parallel-bit 
GHASH modules are selected for designing a high speed AES-GCM architecture discussed 
in section 4.2. 
4.1.1 AES Module 
For the 128-bit key size, the AES algorithm requires calculating 10 round transformations, 
and each round contains four phases: SubBytes, ShiftRows, MixColumns, and 
AddRoundKey (see section 3.1).  This allows implementing AES algorithm in either iterative 
method or pipelined method. In an iterative AES design, the round transformation is 
instantiated only once (see Figure 20). This round transformation block of hardware is used 
10 times in 10 computation clock cycles while the intermediate value is stored in a register 
Ciphertext and used as input for the next time. A pipelined AES design can calculate all 10 
rounds transformations in one clock cycle by duplicated a single round 10 times (see Figure 
14). A pipelined AES architecture can be achieved by placing 128-bit registers between each 
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round. In large FPGAs, registers are almost free; a pipelined structure can take advantage of 
this feature of FPGAs. 
 
Figure 20.  AES Iterative Data Path 
 
Table 6.  Comparison between Iterative and Pipelined AES 
Cost in Virtex-II pro Architectures 
(expanded keys 





ciphertext per 10 
clock cycles With BRAM Without BRAM 
Iterative AES 1 1 418slices+16BRAMs 1678slices 
Pipelined AES 10 10 1613slices+160BRAMs 11693slices 
 
The control logic of both the iterative and pipelined AES architectures is implemented by 
using a finite state machine (FSM). Table 6 shows a rough comparison between these two 
approaches on throughput and cost. 
In AES-GCM algorithm, the AES block is implemented in a pipelined architecture. This 
AES block works as a core in a hybrid from ECB and CTR mode. This hybrid actually is 
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GCTR(see section 3.2.5). Figure 21 shows the structure how the AES block is embedded into 
an ECB module and how the ECB module is embedded into a CTR module. In ECB module, 
AES block encrypts an input which actually is a continuously increasing counter value in 
CTR module, and produces the output as keystream. In CTR module, the keystream XORs a 
plaintext to produce output, i.e. ciphertext. After the first 10 clock cycles, the pipeline is fully 
filled so that the AES module can output a new 128-bit keystream every clock cycle. 
 
Figure 21.  AES CTR over ECB Mode Cipher Structure 
 
The iterative AES can also be adopted in the AES-GCM algorithm, specifically for 
generating the hash subkey H. This calculation can be done in advance if the 128-bit key is 
known because H is nothing but the output of the iterative AES module. Therefore, it needs 
10 clock cycles to generate H after inputting 128 bits ‘0’ string into the iterative AES 
module. 
As briefly mentioned in section 3.1.1, except for the SubBytes operation in round 
transformation, the ShiftRows, MixColumns, and AddRoundKey are all directly designed 
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using CLBs in FPGA. SubBytes which actually is a LUT operation can be designed either 
using CLBs (i.e single-port distributed SelectRAM+, see section 2.3.2.3) or signal-port block 
selectRAM+ (see section 2.3.2.4). Table 8 in section 4.2.3 shows the differences in 
performance and cost between AES-GCM implementations which are purely using CLBs 
and those using both CLBs and Block RAMs. 
4.1.2 GHASH Module 
A 128-bit multiplier over GF(2128) is the core of the GHASH architecture. In AES-GCM, the 
GF(2128) multiplier multiplies two 128-bit operands modulo the field polynomial F(x) = 1 +x 
+ x2 + x7 + x128 to generate a 128-bit output. The GHASH architecture is shown in Figure 22. 
One operand of the GF multiplier is the hash subkey H which can be treated as a fixed 128-
bit constant for it will not change if the 128-bit key does not change. The Register Y whose 








The architecture shown in Figure 22 is based on an iteration operation. Suppose all input 
data and output data are satisfied with the definitions in section 3.2.4. In the first m clock 
cycles, the 128-bit additional authenticated data block sequence (AAD) A1, A2, …, Am are 
hashed to the GHASH  through one of two inputs of XOR gates as described by algorithm 3. 
In the next n clock cycles, the 128-bit ciphertext block sequence C1, C2, …, Cn-1, Cn are 
hashed to the same input of XOR gates following AAD. In the last clock cycle, 128-bit word 
length (A)||length(C) is hashed. Meanwhile, the intermediate hash value Yi (see Figure 16) is 
fed back to another input of XOR gates to generate the another operand for the GF multiplier.  
 It takes m + n + 1 cycles to compute the hash value for bit parallel multiplier, and 128∗(m 
+ n + 1) cycles for Bit Serial multiplier. There is a rough comparison listed in Table 7 
between GHASH architectures using these two kinds of multipliers. 
 
Table 7.  Comparison  between Different GHASH Architectures 
GHASH architecture Latency (clock cycle) Hardware 
complexity (k=128) 
Num of Slices 
Using Bit Serial 
Multiplier 
128 * (m + n + 1) O(k) 282 
Using Mastrovito Bit 
Parallel Multiplier 
m + n +1 O(k2) 8297 
 
In order to match pipelined AES module, the GHASH module is implemented using a 
Mastrovito Bit Parallel GF multiplier. From a whole Mastrovito Bit Parallel GF(2128) 
multiplier point of view, 1282 two-input AND gates and O(1282) two-input XOR gates were 
used for implementation. The delay from this architecture is one AND gate and 7 XOR gates.  
This is the critical path in the entire AES-GCM circuit design. Although a Bit Parallel 
multiplier over GF can be pipelined for high data rate [19], this is not the case for GHASH 
because the GHASH is a kind of feedback mode as mentioned in section 1.1. 
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4.2 High Speed Hardware Implementation of AES-GCM 
This section describes the AES-GCM implementation. It begins by a brief introduction on the 
data packet structure of IPsec ESP [9] in section 4.2.1, then follows with a top level data flow 
description of the pipelined AES and bit parallel GHASH modules in section 4.2.2. Finally 
the details of the AES-GCM implementation are presented in section 4.2.3. 
4.2.1 Format of Data Packet of IPsec ESP 
The IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) Packet Format is shown in Figure 23. Each 
field in Figure 23 is explained as follows: 
Security Parameters Index (SPI) is an arbitrary 32-bit value that uniquely identifies the 
Security Association for this datagram, in combination with the destination IP address and 
security protocol. The SPI field is mandatory. 
Sequence Number is a 32-bit monotonically increasing counter value (sequence number).  
It is mandatory and is always present. 
Salt field is also a 32-bit value that is assigned at the beginning of the security association, 
and then remains constant for the life of the security association.  The salt should be 
unpredictable [10]. 
ESP Payload Data is comprised of a 64-bit initialization vector (IV of ESP), followed by 
the data area, along with an authentication tag T (also known as ICV) associated with the 
payload data.  
The document in [10] clearly explains how to use AES-GCM as an IPsec ESP mechanism 
to provide confidentiality and data origin authentication. More specifically, the additional 
authentication data (AAD of Figure 23) in AES-GCM includes the SPI and Sequence 




Figure 23.  Format of Data Packet of IPsec ESP 
 
Information with respect to the format of data packet of IPsec ESP is provided in 








4.2.2 Data Flow in GCM 
If the AES module is implemented in the pipelined architecture, the GHASH module is 
implemented by choosing a parallel-bit multiplier as its core, and the hash subkey H can be 
calculated out ahead in an iterative AES module based on a known key by each 
communication party. The data flow in GCM Encryption is shown in Figure 25(a); and the 
data flow in GCM Decryption is shown in Figure 25(b). For GCM encryption, AES-GCM 
starts to compute intermediate hash value Yi when it receives additional authenticated data. It 
takes m clock cycles to generate Ym. Then the GHASH has to be idle for 11 clock cycles 
until the first ciphertext block C1 is generated by the GCTR which is created by using a 
pipelined AES module. For GCM with default IV, the IV is always 96 bits long, and J0 can 
be created instantly by concatenation of bit strings. 
The key streams for GCM encryption are created after the 10th clock cycle when J0 is input 
into the pipeline of GCTR. At the 11th clock cycle, cipher block C1 is generated and input to 
GHASH. GHASH begins to hash data again. At the m+11+n+1 clock cycle, Ym+n+1 is 








































Figure 25.  (a) The Data Flow of GCM Encryption (b) The Data Flow of GCM Decryption 
 
For GCM decryption, GHASH can directly compute the authentication tag T’ based on 
AAD and ciphertext C from the input of GCM Decryption. Therefore, the max 11 clock 
cycles are saved compared with data flow in GCM Encryption. 
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4.2.3 Hardware Implementation Bidirectional GCM 
Based on the data flow analysis in section 4.2.2, a bidirectional AES-GCM hardware module 
is built. The “bidirectional” means: the AES-GCM module can work not only as GCM 
encryption but also as GCM decryption depending on the logic value of the control signal 
Encryption. If the Encryption signal is high, then AES-GCM works in GCM encryption 
mode as shown in Figure 26, otherwise, it works in GCM decryption mode.  
If the Encryption signal is high, then AES-GCM works in GCM encryption mode, i.e. 
AES-GCM-AE (see section 3.2.6.1). In Figure 26, the data paths are 128-bit wide. The 
control signals do not show up except signal Encryption. They all are driven by a finite sate 
machine (FSM) module which is designed according to IPsec ESP packet format. The 44 32-
bit round-key words are stored in a look up table instead of generated in real time. The hash 
subkey H is generated by an iterative AES module from the key K in advance.  
A 3-to-1 multiplexer MUX-I is used whose output connects to one of the input ports of 
XOR gates in GHASH module. The three inputs of MUX-I are additional authenticated data 
AAD, ciphertext C and length information length (A)||length(P). As discussed in section 3.2, 
in the first m clock cycles, the output of MUX-I is the additional authenticated data A. After 
11 clock cycles, in the next n clock cycles, the output of MUX-I switches to the ciphertext C. 
The Final output of MUX-I is length (A)||length(P). The first 128-bit key stream which is 
produced by GCTR, from the initial value IV of GCM, is stored in the AESK(J0) Register. 
This AESK(J0) Register is later used to generate the authentication tag T. Since the IV of 
GCM is followed by plaintext P, and the first 128-bit keystream is generated by GCTR after 
a delay of 10 clock cycles. Therefore, the plaintext P is delayed by 11 clock cycles in order to 
be encrypted by the corresponding key streams. A 11* 128-bit FIFO meets this requirement.  
In the first 11 clock cycles, the data flow AAD, IV and payload data P are input to the FIFO. 
From the 12th clock cycle onwards, the FIFO remains in a dynamic full status by reading 
data out and writing new data in simultaneously until reaching the end of the IPsec ESP 
packet. Suffering 11 clock cycles delay through the FIFO, AAD and IV connect directly to 
one of the inputs of the 3-to-1 MUX-II; delayed payload data P exclusive-ORs with GCTR 
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output, key stream, to produce ciphertext which is connected to one input of MUX-I and 
MUX-II. The left input of MUX-II is the authentication tag T which is the result of GHASH 
final output Ym+n+1 XORing value in AESK(J0) Register. MUX-II output connects to register 
Output. The final output of AES-GCM-AE from register Output is data flow A_IV_C_T 
corresponding to the input data flow A_IV_P. 
 




As mentioned in section 4.1.2, the critical path of this design is determined by the GHASH 
module. The delay of all other paths in Figure 26 is smaller than the delay produced by 
GHASH module. 
If Encryption is low, then AES-GCM works as GCM decryption. i.e. AES-GCM-AD (see 
section 3.2.6.2). AES-GCM-AD is similar to AES-GCM-AE. Compared with Figure 26, one 
difference is that two 2-to-1 multiplexers, also named MUX-I and MUX-II are used instead 
of two 3-to-1 multiplexers in the Figure 26. The reason that 2-to-1 multiplexers are used is 
that the authentication tag T’ is computed directly from A and C of the original input 
A_IV_C_T and it does not need to be input into register Output either. Another difference is 
that a 128-bit comparator is used to generate the FAIL signal depending on the comparison 
between T and T’. The delay of the comparator is 1 XOR gate plus 7 OR gates which is still 
smaller than the delay of the 128-bit bit parallel multiplier over GF(2128) which is 1 AND 
gate plus 7 XOR gates. 
Like the S-box of AES module in section 4.1.1, the 11*128-bit FIFO can also be 
implemented by using dual-port Block SelectRAM+ or dual-port Distributed SelectRAM+. 
Therefore, AES-GCM can be implemented either by purely using CLBs or using CLBs and 
block RAM. Table 8 lists the performance and cost comparison of these designs. Table 1 
shows that there are totally 44096 slices and 444 Blocks SelectRAM+ in Virtex-II pro 
xc2vp100. Therefore, for the scheme (1), 48.5% (21409/44096=0.485) slices are used to 
implement AES-GCM; for the scheme (2), 24.4% (10797/44096=0.244) slices and 36.9% 
(164/444=0.369) BRAM blocks are used. 
Table 8.  AES-GCM Implementations on Block RAM and Distributed RAM 
Scheme(1) Purely using CLBs Scheme(2) Using CLBs + BRAMs  
Clock Rate Throughput Area Cost Clock Rate Throughput Area Cost 
AES-GCM 75.7MHz* 9.68 Gbps 21409slices 75.8 MHz* 9.70 Gbps 10797slices 
+164BRAMs




4.3 Verification of AES-GCM Functionality 
This section describes how the modules were verified in the realistic environment CMC-
prototype-platform. All of them including AES, GHASH, AES-GCM-AE, and AES-GCM-
AD were verified on this platform. They were also although designed in VHDL and timing 
simulated using Modelsim, respectively. The results are compared with other researches on 
hardware implementations of AES-GCM. 
4.3.1 IPsec Signal Generator 
In order to perform verification, an IPsec ESP signal Generator had to be built based on the 
IPsec ESP data packet format discussed in section 4.2.1. Figure 27 shows a 16-bit LFSR 
which generates 216-1 bit stream sequence periodically based on a primitive polynomial f(x)= 
1+x+x3+x12+X16 for building the IPsec signal generator which consisted of 8 16-bit LFSRs. 
The primitive polynomial with degree 16 was chosen since the maximum length of payload 
data of IPsec data packet is 216 bit long.  At the beginning, the control signal start_LFSR 
asserts for m clock cycles, the signal generator generates m blocks of parallel 128-bit data as 
AAD; at the next clock cycle, start_LFSR desserts for generating IV-GCM; sequentially, 
start_LFSR asserts again for n clock cycles in order to generate n blocks of parallel 128-bit 
data as payload data P. The values of m and n are controlled by one input of the signal 










Figure 27.  16-bit LFSR for IPsec ESP Signal Generator 
 
4.3.2 Verifying Both AES-GCM-AE and AES-GCM-AD on FPGA 
In Figure 28, two AES-GCM modules are used, one working as AES-GCM-AE by 
connecting Encryption to the power, one working as AES-GCM-AD by connecting 
Encryption to the ground. The mimic IPsec data packets A_IV_P from the signal generator 
go through the AES-GCM-AE and the AES-GCM-AD consecutively, and then go to the 
comparison module in which there is another identical IPsec signal generator for checking 
the recovered data P validity. If each node in Figure 28 works correctly, then the plaintext P 
will be recovered from the AES-GCM-AD without any bit-errors, the signal Verifying_GCM 
will go to high to indicate the AES-GCM-AE and the AES-GCM-AD have been verified 
successfully. The comparison between T and T’ is handled in the AES-GCM-AD module. If 
T is not equal to T’, then the signal T_Verification (corresponding the output Fail in 
algorithm 6) will be set to high to indicate that the inputs are not authentic. The signal 
Verifying_GCM and T_Verification physically are connected to two LEDs on the CMC-




Figure 28.  AES-GCM Verification System 
 
After choosing 40MHz clock input as the global clock of FPGA, downloading the 
bitstream of the described architecture in Figure 28 to the CMC-prototype-platform, and 
configuring the Virtex-II pro xc2vp100, the LED Verifying_GCM turns on and LED 
T_Verification remains off. Hence the module with AES-GCM functionality is implemented 
successfully on FPGA platform.  
In addition, in the appendix B of [12], the designers of GCM provides several cases of test 
vectors for testing AES-GCM implementation designs with different AES key sizes. The 
Test Case 3 and Test Case 4 are chosen to verify the work in this thesis. More specifically,  
first, using the 128-bit secret key K provided in Test Case 3 or Test Case 4 generates not only 
44 32-bit expanded key words for AES round-transformations but also hash subkey H for 
GHASH hash operations; second, using the additional authentication data A, the initial vector 
IV, and the plaintext data P provided in Test Case 3 or Test Case 4 as parameters builds a 
test-bench which works as a stimulus to output data flow A_IV_P into AES-GCM module 
for timing simulation; Finally, comparing the results A_IV_C_T of the timing simulation of 
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AES-GCM with the A’_IV’_C’_T’ provided in Test Case 3 and Test Case 4 and make sure 
they are identical (see the dash-line part of Figure 28). 
All the VHDL codes for generating AES-GCM, test benches, and test vectors are printed 
out and listed in Appendixes. The hierarchical HDL code designs are shown in Figure 29. 
 
 
Figure 29.  AES-GCM Hierarchical HDL Codes Design 
 
4.4 Comparison with Other Research 
Research on hardware architectures or implementations of GCM is fairly small. This is likely 
due to the new mode of operation based on symmetric block cipher. However, some precious 
research involving GCM Encryption and Decryption based on AES is given in Table 9 for a 
comparison. In Table 9, except the design (3) implemented in FPGA, i.e. the work in this 
thesis, both design (1) and (2) complete AES-GCM implementations on CMOS technology. 
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The design (1) is a commercialized IP core named CLP-24 which is built by the company 
Elliptic Semiconductor Inc. CLP-24 supports for three key sizes − 256, 192, or 128 bit keys. 
Its input data bit-width is configurable. 
Table 9.  AES-GCM Implementation Results 
GCM En/Decryption 
Designs 
Technology Areas Clock Rates Throughputs Time 
(1) Elliptic 
Semiconductor Inc. [11] 
ASIC 97k gates 300 MHz 7 Gbps 2006 
(2) Bo Yang, Sambit 
Mishra, et al.  [20] 
ASIC 498k gates 271 MHz * 34.7 Gbps 2005 
(3) Work in this thesis 
 
FPGA 21409 slices 76 MHz * 9.7 Gbps 2006 
Notes *: based on simulation results. 
 
The design (2) demonstrates AES-GCM architecture which is similar to the architecture 
discussed in this thesis, using a 0.18 um CMOS standard cell library. In design (2), the 
proposed architecture is modeled in Verilog HDL and simulated using Modelsim. The 
Verilog models were synthesized using Synopsys Design Compiler. The cost and clock rate 
were reported after the netlist is generated by Synopsys Design Compiler and placed and 
routed by Cadence Silicon Ensemble. 
Comparing design (1) and design (2), the area cost of design (1) is one-fifth of that of 
design (2); the throughput of design (1) is one-fifth of that of design (2) also. Design (2) is a 
128-bit bus width architecture, thus, design (1) is likely an architecture based on inner 32-bit 
bus width.   
In [23], authors claim that the ratio of critical path delay, from FPGA to ASIC is roughly 3 
to 4, with less influence from block memory and hard multipliers. Comparing ASIC design 
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(2) and FPGA design (3) because both of them have similar 128-bit bus width AES-GCM 





5.1 Summary and Contributions 
In this thesis, the development of a complete architecture for the AES-GCM security 
standard has been discussed. The AES-GCM takes advantage of the new block cipher 
algorithm AES and hash function GHASH which is based on the multiplication algorithm 
over finite field GF (2128). Field addition and multiplication are represented with respect to 
the polynomial basis while the non-feedback security operation modes ECB and CTR are 
introduced for they are the fundamental of the confidentiality of GCM. AES implementation 
schemes are discussed in both iterative and pipelined architectures while GHASH 
implementation schemes are discussed also in both Serial-bit and Parallel-bit methods. The 
AES-GCM architecture was designed to support IPsec ESP application or others. Compared 
with previous researches which were only implemented in ASICs, this FPGA architecture is 
robust and achieves a good throughput from the pipelining design. The feasibility of the 
AES-GCM architecture has been verified through a prototype implementation on the CMC-
Prototype FPGA platform which worked in the Stand-alone mode (see section 2.4). 
The Contributions achieved in this work are as follows: 
• This is the first time that the author is aware of an implementation of the AES-
GCM security standard has been performed in a FPGA platform. 
• AES-GCM module can work in bidirection, either GCM encryption or GCM 
decryption. 




5.2 Future Work 
Although the proposed AES-GCM modules were optimized by following approaches: 
• Remove Reset signal from data flow, 
• Replicate registers, 
• Flat the hierarchical code structure, 
• Use parentheses on arithmetic equations to suggest parallelism, 
• Perform arithmetic on the minimum length of bits needed to reduce operation 
strength, 
• Pipeline architecture, 
• Increase fan-out ability, 
• Insert buffer, 
There may still be improvement possible with respect to the performance based on 
following issues: 
• Bad Packing, bad packing means two LUTs that are packed together and nets go to 
different locations. 
• Bad Placement, bad placement means logic placed far away from each other. 
• Poor IO Timing, poor IO timing means an IO signal uses a flip-flop in CLB 
instead of the one in IOB.  
• High Fanout Net, high fanout net meant a net connecting to too many different 
loads in the FPGA chip. 
• Too many levels of logic, this kind of circuit is usually critical path (see Appendix 
F). 
Furthermore, AES-GCM may also work as an IP cores in the Base-line mode as mentioned 
in section 2.4. Section 4.2.3 shows that AES-GCM design implemented in this thesis 
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occupies 48.5% or 24.4% resources of the FPGA without or with using BRAM. Since 
approximate 93% FPGA resources are free in the Base-line mode, the AES-GCM IP core can 
hang on the bus PLB inside the FPGA to encrypt and authenticate the data buffered in DDR-
SDRAM. Figure 30 illustrates how the AES-GCM IP core can work in the Base-line mode. 
Data in DDR-SDRAM go through the 64-bit 80MHz PLB bus to the 128-bit bandwidth AES-
GCM module which works in 40MHz to be authenticated and encrypted, then output to the 
MGT IP cores (Multi-Gigabit Transciever) to be sent out from the high speed serial ports. Or, 
the authenticated and encrypted input data can be received from the MTG, then verified and 
decrypted by AES-GCM and buffered in DDR-SDRAM through PLB bus. 
 







Test-Vectors for AES-GCM [12] 
GCM Test Case #03 (AES-128) 
Variable          Value 
------------------------------------------------- 
K               : feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308 
P               : d9313225f88406e5a55909c5aff5269a 
                : 86a7a9531534f7da2e4c303d8a318a72 
                : 1c3c0c95956809532fcf0e2449a6b525 
                : b16aedf5aa0de657ba637b391aafd255 
IV              : cafebabefacedbaddecaf888 
H               : b83b533708bf535d0aa6e52980d53b78 
Y_0             : cafebabefacedbaddecaf88800000001 
E(K,Y_0)        : 3247184b3c4f69a44dbcd22887bbb418 
Y_1             : cafebabefacedbaddecaf88800000002 
E(K,Y_1)        : 9bb22ce7d9f372c1ee2b28722b25f206 
Y_2             : cafebabefacedbaddecaf88800000003 
E(K,Y_2)        : 650d887c3936533a1b8d4e1ea39d2b5c 
Y_3             : cafebabefacedbaddecaf88800000004 
E(K,Y_3)        : 3de91827c10e9a4f5240647ee5221f20 
Y_4             : cafebabefacedbaddecaf88800000005 
E(K,Y_4)        : aac9e6ccc0074ac0873b9ba85d908bd0 
X_1             : 59ed3f2bb1a0aaa07c9f56c6a504647b 
X_2             : b714c9048389afd9f9bc5c1d4378e052 
X_3             : 47400c6577b1ee8d8f40b2721e86ff10 
X_4             : 4796cf49464704b5dd91f159bb1b7f95 
len(A)||len(C)  : 00000000000000000000000000000200 
GHASH(H,A,C)    : 7f1b32b81b820d02614f8895ac1d4eac 
C               : 42831ec2217774244b7221b784d0d49c 
                : e3aa212f2c02a4e035c17e2329aca12e 
                : 21d514b25466931c7d8f6a5aac84aa05 
                : 1ba30b396a0aac973d58e091473f5985 











GCM Test Case #04 (AES-128) 
Variable          Value 
------------------------------------------------- 
K               : feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308 
P               : d9313225f88406e5a55909c5aff5269a 
                : 86a7a9531534f7da2e4c303d8a318a72 
                : 1c3c0c95956809532fcf0e2449a6b525 
                : b16aedf5aa0de657ba637b39 
A               : feedfacedeadbeeffeedfacedeadbeef 
                : abaddad2 
IV              : cafebabefacedbaddecaf888 
H               : b83b533708bf535d0aa6e52980d53b78 
Y_0             : cafebabefacedbaddecaf88800000001 
E(K,Y_0)        : 3247184b3c4f69a44dbcd22887bbb418 
X_1             : ed56aaf8a72d67049fdb9228edba1322 
X_2             : cd47221ccef0554ee4bb044c88150352 
Y_1             : cafebabefacedbaddecaf88800000002 
E(K,Y_1)        : 9bb22ce7d9f372c1ee2b28722b25f206 
Y_2             : cafebabefacedbaddecaf88800000003 
E(K,Y_2)        : 650d887c3936533a1b8d4e1ea39d2b5c 
Y_3             : cafebabefacedbaddecaf88800000004 
E(K,Y_3)        : 3de91827c10e9a4f5240647ee5221f20 
Y_4             : cafebabefacedbaddecaf88800000005 
E(K,Y_4)        : aac9e6ccc0074ac0873b9ba85d908bd0 
X_3             : 54f5e1b2b5a8f9525c23924751a3ca51 
X_4             : 324f585c6ffc1359ab371565d6c45f93 
X_5             : ca7dd446af4aa70cc3c0cd5abba6aa1c 
X_6             : 1590df9b2eb6768289e57d56274c8570 
len(A)||len(C)  : 00000000000000a000000000000001e0 
GHASH(H,A,C)    : 698e57f70e6ecc7fd9463b7260a9ae5f 
C               : 42831ec2217774244b7221b784d0d49c 
                : e3aa212f2c02a4e035c17e2329aca12e 
                : 21d514b25466931c7d8f6a5aac84aa05 
                : 1ba30b396a0aac973d58e091 












package datatypes is     ----Package definition 
type key_arr is array (0 to Nr) of std_logic_vector(0 to 127);        
type RCbox is array (0 to 10) of std_logic_vector (7 downto 0); 
type MatrixU is array (0 to 127) of std_logic_vector(0 to 127); 
type shiftN_B is array (0 to 3) of integer range 0 to 3; 
type rom_type is array (0 to 255) of std_logic_vector (7 downto 0); 
constant Nb: integer:=4; 
constant Nk: integer:=4; 
constant Nr: integer:=10; 
constant R: std_logic_vector(0 to 7):=B"11100001";      --"11100001 + 0000.....00" 
constant shiftNb: shiftN_B:=(0, 3, 2, 1); 
constant ROM: rom_type :=( 
--0  
 X"63", X"7c", X"77", X"7b",  X"f2", X"6b", X"6f", X"c5",  X"30", X"01", X"67", X"2b", X"fe", X"d7", X"ab", X"76", 
--1 
 X"ca", X"82", X"c9", X"7d",  X"fa", X"59", X"47", X"f0",  X"ad", X"d4", X"a2", X"af", X"9c", X"a4", X"72", X"c0", 
--2 
 X"b7", X"fd", X"93", X"26",  X"36", X"3f", X"f7", X"cc",  X"34", X"a5", X"e5", X"f1", X"71", X"d8", X"31", X"15", 
--3 
 X"04", X"c7", X"23", X"c3",  X"18", X"96", X"05", X"9a",  X"07", X"12", X"80", X"e2", X"eb", X"27", X"b2", X"75", 
--4 
 X"09", X"83", X"2c", X"1a",  X"1b", X"6e", X"5a", X"a0",  X"52", X"3b", X"d6", X"b3", X"29", X"e3", X"2f", X"84", 
--5 
 X"53", X"d1", X"00", X"ed",  X"20", X"fc", X"b1", X"5b",  X"6a", X"cb", X"be", X"39", X"4a", X"4c", X"58", X"cf", 
--6 
 X"d0", X"ef", X"aa", X"fb",  X"43", X"4d", X"33", X"85",  X"45", X"f9", X"02", X"7f", X"50", X"3c", X"9f", X"a8", 
--7 
 X"51", X"a3", X"40", X"8f",  X"92", X"9d", X"38", X"f5",  X"bc", X"b6", X"da", X"21", X"10", X"ff", X"f3", X"d2", 
--8 




 X"60", X"81", X"4f", X"dc",  X"22", X"2a", X"90", X"88",  X"46", X"ee", X"b8", X"14", X"de", X"5e", X"0b", X"db", 
--10 
 X"e0", X"32", X"3a", X"0a",  X"49", X"06", X"24", X"5c",  X"c2", X"d3", X"ac", X"62", X"91", X"95", X"e4", X"79", 
--11 
 X"e7", X"c8", X"37", X"6d",  X"8d", X"d5", X"4e", X"a9",  X"6c", X"56", X"f4", X"ea", X"65", X"7a", X"ae", X"08", 
--12 
 X"ba", X"78", X"25", X"2e",  X"1c", X"a6", X"b4", X"c6",  X"e8", X"dd", X"74", X"1f", X"4b", X"bd", X"8b", X"8a", 
--13 
 X"70", X"3e", X"b5", X"66",  X"48", X"03", X"f6", X"0e",  X"61", X"35", X"57", X"b9", X"86", X"c1", X"1d", X"9e", 
--14 
 X"e1", X"f8", X"98", X"11",  X"69", X"d9", X"8e", X"94",  X"9b", X"1e", X"87", X"e9", X"ce", X"55", X"28", X"df", 
--15 




constant RoundKeySet: Key_arr:= (  ---for GCM Test-Case 4 only 
    (X"feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308"),  --for Round 0 
    (X"fb13d9177d76aa0b101c259f772ca697"),  --for Round 1 
        (X"883751e2f541fbe9e55dde76927178e1"), 
    (X"2f8ba9addaca52443f978c32ade6f4d3"), 
    (X"a934cf3873fe9d7c4c69114ee18fe59d"), 
    (X"caed91c0b9130cbcf57a1df214f5f86f"), 
    (X"0cac393ab5bf358640c528745430d01b"), 
    (X"48dc961afd63a39cbda68be8e9965bf3"), 
    (X"58e59b04a58638981820b370f1b6e883"), 
    (X"0d7e77a5a8f84f3db0d8fc4d416e14ce"), 
    (X"a484fc260c7cb31bbca44f56fdca5b98") 
   );  
 
 
--constant RoundKeySet: Key_arr:= ( ---for AES spec only 
--    (X"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c"), 
--    (X"a0fafe1788542cb123a339392a6c7605"), 
--        (X"f2c295f27a96b9435935807a7359f67f"), 
--    (X"3D80477D4716FE3E1E237E446D7A883B"), 
--    (X"ef44a541a8525b7fb671253bdb0bad00"), 
--    (X"d4d1c6f87c839d87caf2b8bc11f915bc"), 
--    (X"6d88a37a110b3efddbf98641ca0093fd"), 
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--    (X"4e54f70e5f5fc9f384a64fb24ea6dc4f"), 
--    (X"ead27321b58dbad2312bf5607f8d292f"), 
--    (X"ac7766f319fadc2128d12941575c006e"), 
--    (X"d014f9a8c9ee2589e13f0cc8b6630ca6") 
--    );  
 
--=================================================================== 
constant Rcon: RCbox:= ( 
(X"00", X"01", X"02", X"04",  
 X"08", X"10", X"20", X"40",  
 X"80", X"1b", X"36") 
);  
--==================================================================== 
function multiply_by_02(multiplicand: in std_logic_vector(7 downto 0)) return std_logic_vector; 
function multiply_by_03(multiplicand: in std_logic_vector(7 downto 0)) return std_logic_vector; 
function rightshift(X: in std_logic_vector(0 to 127)) return std_logic_vector; 
end datatypes; 
 
package body datatypes is  
 
function multiply_by_02(multiplicand: in std_logic_vector(7 downto 0)) return std_logic_vector is 
variable temp: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0); 
begin 
temp:=multiplicand; 
if (temp(7)='1') then 
temp:=(temp(6 downto 0)&'0') xor X"1b";   --"temp" for loading multiply by 02; 
else  
temp:=(temp(6 downto 0)&'0');    --"temp" for loading multiply by 02; 
end if; 
return temp; 
end function multiply_by_02; 
 
function multiply_by_03(multiplicand: in std_logic_vector(7 downto 0)) return std_logic_vector is 
variable temp: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0); 
begin 
temp:=multiplicand; 
if (temp(7)='1') then 
temp:=(temp(6 downto 0)&'0') xor X"1b";    --"temp" for loading multiply by 02; 
else  




temp:=multiplicand xor temp;     --after *2, do addition (+1) 
return temp; 
end function multiply_by_03; 
 
function rightshift(X: in std_logic_vector(0 to 127)) return std_logic_vector is 
variable temp: std_logic_vector(0 to 127); 
begin 
for i in 0 to 126 loop 
temp(i+1) := X(i); 
end loop; 
temp(0) := '0'; 
return temp; 
end function rightshift; 
 





VHDL Codes for AES-GCM modules 
Notes:  
1. Even some modules are seemingly “Behavioral” architectures, but they are actually 
“Structural” architectures. 
2. Refer to Figure 29. AES-GCM Hierarchical HDL Codes Design. 
3. All these codes were synthesized, simulated and ran based on the tools as follows: 
a) Xilinx ISE7.0i 
b) Monter Graphics ModelSim SE 6.1a 
c) Xilinx FPGA Virtex-II pro xc2vp100 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
-- Design Name:    AES-GCM 







entity GCM_Verification is 
port( 
   clk: in std_logic; 
  Reset_n: in std_logic; 
  --A_P_Len: std_logic_vector(0 to 31); 
        LFSR_16bit_out_prime, P_16bit_out: out std_logic_vector(0 to 15); 
  Sec_LED: out std_logic;    
  T_Verification: out std_logic; 
  Verifying_GCM: out std_logic; 
  floating: out std_logic; 
  clk_out: out std_logic; 










    clk: in std_logic; 
  reset: in std_logic;  
  start_LFSR: in std_logic; 
  LFSR_IV: in std_logic_vector(0 to 15); 
   LFSR_parallel_out: out std_logic_vector(0 to 15) 





   clk: in std_logic; 
  reset: in std_logic;  
  start_GCM: out std_logic; 
  H: out std_logic_vector(0 to 127); 
   A_IV_P: out std_logic_vector(0 to 127); 






   clk: in std_logic; 
  reset: in std_logic;  
  start_GCM: in std_logic; 
  Encryption: in std_logic; 
  H: in std_logic_vector(0 to 127); 
   A_IV_P: in std_logic_vector(0 to 127); 
   A_P_Len: in std_logic_vector(31 downto 0); 
   A_IV_C_T: out std_logic_vector(0 to 127); 
  T_Verification: out std_logic; 




constant Low : std_logic :='0'; 




signal start_GCM, start_GCM_decryption, start_compr, Verification, Sec_output, reset: std_logic; 
signal H: std_logic_vector(0 to 127); 
signal A_IV_P,A_IV_C_T, P, LFSR_128bit_prime: std_logic_vector(0 to 127); 
signal A_P_Len: std_logic_vector(0 to 31); 
signal LFSR_IV, LFSR_16bit_out: std_logic_vector(0 to 15); 




reset <= not Reset_n; 




port map ( 
   clk=>clk, 
  reset=>reset,  
  start_GCM=>start_GCM, 
  H=>H, 
   A_IV_P=>A_IV_P, 





   clk=>clk, 
  reset=>reset,  
  start_GCM=>start_GCM, 
  Encryption=>High, 
  H=>H, 
   A_IV_P=>A_IV_P, 
   A_P_Len=>A_P_Len, 
   A_IV_C_T=>A_IV_C_T, 
  T_Verification=> floating, 







   clk=>clk, 
  reset=>reset,  
  start_GCM=>start_GCM_decryption, 
  Encryption=>Low, 
  H=>H, 
   A_IV_P=>A_IV_C_T, 
   A_P_Len=>A_P_Len, 
   A_IV_C_T=>P, 
  T_Verification=>T_Verification, 





    clk=>clk, 
  reset=>reset, 
  start_LFSR=>start_compr, 
  LFSR_IV=>LFSR_IV, 
   LFSR_parallel_out=>LFSR_16bit_out 
 ); 
 
LFSR_128bit_prime <= LFSR_16bit_out & LFSR_16bit_out & LFSR_16bit_out & LFSR_16bit_out  
& LFSR_16bit_out &  LFSR_16bit_out & LFSR_16bit_out &  LFSR_16bit_out; 
LFSR_16bit_out_prime <= LFSR_16bit_out; 




if clk'event and clk='1' then 




































if Sec_counter = 20000000 then  ---20000000 
Sec_output <= not Sec_output; 
Sec_counter <=0; 
else 






data_valid <= start_compr; 








-- Design Name:    AES-GCM 









entity GCM is 
 port( 
   clk: in std_logic; 
  reset: in std_logic;  
  start_GCM: in std_logic; 
  Encryption: in std_logic; 
  H: in std_logic_vector(0 to 127); 
   A_IV_P: in std_logic_vector(0 to 127); 
   A_P_Len: in std_logic_vector(31 downto 0); 
   A_IV_C_T: out std_logic_vector(0 to 127); 
  T_Verification: out std_logic; 




architecture Behavioral of GCM is 
 
component AES_Pipelined 
 port (  
  encrypt: in std_logic; 
  clk: in std_logic; 
  reset: in std_logic; 
  plaintext: in std_logic_vector(0 to 127); 
  ciphertext: out std_logic_vector(0 to 127) 







 port ( 
  clk: IN std_logic; 
  sinit: IN std_logic; 
  din: IN std_logic_VECTOR(127 downto 0); 
  wr_en: IN std_logic; 
  rd_en: IN std_logic; 
  dout: OUT std_logic_VECTOR(127 downto 0); 
  full: OUT std_logic; 





   port( 
   clk: in std_logic; 
   reset: in std_logic; 
  H: in std_logic_vector(0 to 127);  
   AC: in std_logic_vector(0 to 127); 




signal counter, time_for_calculate_TT_prime: integer range 0 to 2047;   --because of 1023+Fifo_delay+2; 
signal C, C_delay, Mux2out, Mux3out, AC, X, FIFO_out: std_logic_vector(0 to 127);  
signal EKY0, IV_counter, Key_stream, FIFO_out_delay, T, TT, TT_prime: std_logic_vector(0 to 127); 
signal wr_en, rd_en, full, empty: std_logic; 
signal H_2, A_IV_P_2: std_logic_vector(0 to 127); 
signal A_P_Len_1, A_P_Len_2, A_P_Len_3, A_P_Len_4: std_logic_vector(31 downto 0); 
 
signal Rem_128_A, Rem_128_P: integer range 0 to 127; 
signal Num_128_A, Num_128_P: integer range 0 to 511; 
signal FIFO_Delay: integer range 0 to 15; 
signal Num_128_IV: integer range 0 to 1; 
signal Reg_Delay: integer range 0 to 1; 








Rem_128_A <= conv_integer(A_P_Len_1(22 downto 16));   -- indicate how many bits for last segment of A; 
Rem_128_P <= conv_integer(A_P_Len_1(6 downto 0));  -- indicate how many bits for last segment of P; 
 
process(A_P_Len_3, A_P_Len_4, Rem_128_A, Rem_128_P) 
begin 
if Rem_128_A =0 then 
Num_128_A <= conv_integer(A_P_Len_3(31 downto 23)); 
else 
Num_128_A <= (conv_integer(A_P_Len_3(31 downto 23)) + 1); 
end if; 
if Rem_128_P =0 then 
Num_128_P <= conv_integer(A_P_Len_4(15 downto 7)); 
else 




FIFO_Delay <= 11;      -- 11 cycles delay for deleted bulb between A_IV and C;  
Num_128_IV <= 1;      -- at here, We only choose IV is 96-bit long, so Num_128_IV = 1; 
Reg_Delay <= 1;    -- 1 cycles delay for deleted bulb between C and T; 






if clk'event and clk='1' then    
 if reset='0' and start_GCM='1' then 
 
  if counter = 0 then 
   wr_en <= '1'; 
  end if; 
  if counter =10 then 
   rd_en <='1'; 
  end if; 
  if counter = (Num_128_A+Num_128_IV+Num_128_P) then 
   wr_en <= '0'; 
        end if; 
  if counter = (FIFO_Delay+Num_128_A)+(Num_128_IV+Num_128_P) then 
   rd_en <= '0'; 
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        end if; 
  counter <= counter + 1;  
 
 else 
  counter <=0; 
  wr_en <= '0'; 
  rd_en <= '0';  






if clk'event and clk='1' then    
if counter = 0 then 
-- H_2 <= H; 
 A_P_Len_1 <= A_P_Len; 
 A_P_Len_2 <= A_P_Len; 
 A_P_Len_3 <= A_P_Len; 










MUX2:process(A_P_Len_2, A_IV_P_2, C, counter, Encryption, Num_128_A, Num_128_IV, Num_128_P) 
begin 
if Encryption ='1' then 
if 0 < counter and counter <= Num_128_A then 
Mux2out <= A_IV_P_2; 
elsif (FIFO_Delay+Num_128_A+Num_128_IV) < counter and counter <= (FIFO_Delay+Num_128_A)+(Num_128_IV+Num_128_P) then 
Mux2out <= C; 
else 







if 0 < counter and counter <= Num_128_A then 
Mux2out <= A_IV_P_2; 
elsif (Num_128_A+Num_128_IV < counter and counter <=Num_128_A+Num_128_IV+Num_128_P) then 
Mux2out <= A_IV_P_2; 
else 
Mux2out <= (X"000000000000")&A_P_Len_2(31 downto 16)&(X"000000000000")&A_P_Len_2(15 downto 0); 
end if; 
end if; 
end process;  
----------------------------------------- 
MUX3:process(FIFO_out_delay, C_delay, T, counter, Encryption, Num_128_A, Num_128_IV, Num_128_P)   
  
begin 
if Encryption ='1' then 
if (FIFO_Delay+Reg_Delay) < counter and counter <=(FIFO_Delay+Reg_Delay)+(Num_128_A+Num_128_IV) then 
Mux3out <= FIFO_out_delay; 
elsif (FIFO_Delay+Reg_Delay)+(Num_128_A+Num_128_IV) < counter  
and counter <= (FIFO_Delay+Reg_Delay)+(Num_128_A+Num_128_IV)+Num_128_P then 
Mux3out <= C_delay; 
else 
Mux3out <= T;    
end if; 
else 
if (FIFO_Delay+Reg_Delay)+(Num_128_A+Num_128_IV) < counter  
and counter <= (FIFO_Delay+Reg_Delay)+(Num_128_A+Num_128_IV)+Num_128_P then 
Mux3out <= C_delay; 
else 
Mux3out <= FIFO_out_delay; 
end if; 
end if; 




if clk'event and clk='1' then 
if reset='1'then 




if Encryption ='1' then 
if (0 < counter and counter <= Num_128_A) or ((FIFO_Delay+Num_128_A+Num_128_IV) < counter  
and counter <= (FIFO_Delay+Num_128_A)+(Num_128_IV+Num_128_P)+Num_128_T) then     
AC <= Mux2out xor X; 
end if; 
else 
if (0 < counter and counter <= Num_128_A) or (Num_128_A+Num_128_IV < counter  
and counter <= (Num_128_A+Num_128_IV)+(Num_128_P+Num_128_T)) then 









if clk'event and clk='1' then 
if counter=(Num_128_A+Num_128_IV) then 
IV_counter <= A_IV_P_2; 
elsif counter>(Num_128_A+Num_128_IV) then 







if clk'event and clk='1' then 
if counter=(FIFO_Delay+Num_128_A+Num_128_IV) then 







if clk'event and clk='1' then 








if clk'event and clk='1' then 






if clk'event and clk='1' then 
if Encryption ='1' then 
if (FIFO_Delay+Reg_Delay) < counter  
and counter <=(FIFO_Delay+Reg_Delay)+(Num_128_A+Num_128_IV)+(Num_128_P+Num_128_T) then  
    
A_IV_C_T <= Mux3out; 
end if; 
else 
if (FIFO_Delay+Reg_Delay) < counter and counter <= (FIFO_Delay+Reg_Delay)+(Num_128_A+Num_128_IV)+Num_128_P then 












if Encryption ='1' then 
if (FIFO_Delay+Reg_Delay)-1 < counter  
and counter <=(FIFO_Delay+FIFO_Delay+Reg_Delay)+(Num_128_A+Num_128_IV)+(Num_128_P+Num_128_T+1) then 







if FIFO_Delay+Num_128_A+Num_128_IV+Reg_Delay < counter  
and counter <= (FIFO_Delay+Num_128_A)+(Num_128_IV+Num_128_P)+Reg_Delay then 










 port map ( 
  clk => clk, 
  sinit => reset, 
  din => A_IV_P_2, 
  wr_en => wr_en, 
  rd_en => rd_en, 
  dout =>FIFO_out, 
  full => full, 




 port map( 
  encrypt=>start_GCM, 
  clk => clk, 
  reset=>reset, 
  plaintext=> IV_counter, 
  ciphertext=> Key_stream  




 port map( 
   clk=>clk, 
   reset=>reset, 
  H=>H,  
   AC=>AC, 





process(FIFO_out, Key_stream, counter, Rem_128_P, Num_128_A, Num_128_IV, Num_128_P) 
begin 
if counter = (FIFO_Delay+Num_128_A)+(Num_128_IV+Num_128_P) then 
 
if Rem_128_P = 0 then          
  
C <= FIFO_out xor Key_stream; 
else 
C <= FIFO_out xor Key_stream;   










if clk'event and clk='1' then 
if reset='1'then 
TT <=(others => '1'); 
else 
--if Encryption ='0' then 
if counter = (Num_128_A+Num_128_IV)+(Num_128_P+Num_128_T) then 








process(Num_128_A, Num_128_IV, Num_128_P, FIFO_Delay) 
begin 
if (FIFO_Delay) < (Num_128_P+1) then 










if clk'event and clk='1' then 
if reset='1'then 
TT_prime <=(others => '0'); 
else 
--if Encryption ='0' then 
if counter= time_for_calculate_TT_prime then    









if clk'event and clk='1' then 
if reset='1' then   
T_Verification <='0'; 
else 
--if Encryption ='0' then 
if counter=(time_for_calculate_TT_prime+1) then 
if TT_prime /= TT then 















-- Design Name:    AES-GCM 








entity AES_Pipelined is 
port (  
      encrypt: in std_logic; 
    clk: in std_logic; 
      reset: in std_logic; 
   plaintext: in std_logic_vector(0 to 127); 
   ciphertext: out std_logic_vector(0 to 127) 
   ); 
end AES_Pipelined; 
 




  encrypt: in std_logic; 
  clk: in std_logic; 
  reset: in std_logic; 
  round_input: in std_logic_vector(0 to 127); 
  roundkey: in std_logic_vector(0 to 127); 
  round_output: out std_logic_vector(0 to 127) 





  encrypt: in std_logic; 
  clk: in std_logic; 
  reset: in std_logic; 
  last_round_input: in std_logic_vector(0 to 127); 
  roundkey: in std_logic_vector(0 to 127); 
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  last_round_output: out std_logic_vector(0 to 127) 
  ); 
end component; 
 
signal first_round_output: std_logic_vector(0 to 127); 
signal round_1_output: std_logic_vector(0 to 127); 
signal round_2_output: std_logic_vector(0 to 127); 
signal round_3_output: std_logic_vector(0 to 127); 
signal round_4_output: std_logic_vector(0 to 127); 
signal round_5_output: std_logic_vector(0 to 127); 
signal round_6_output: std_logic_vector(0 to 127); 
signal round_7_output: std_logic_vector(0 to 127); 
signal round_8_output: std_logic_vector(0 to 127); 
signal round_9_output: std_logic_vector(0 to 127); 




ciphertext <= last_round_output; 
first_round_output <= RoundKeySet(0) xor plaintext; 
 
round_1:  
AES_1to9_round PORT MAP( 
  encrypt => encrypt, 
  clk => clk, 
  reset => reset, 
  round_input => first_round_output, 
  roundkey => RoundKeySet(1), 
  round_output => round_1_output 
  ); 
 
round_2:  
AES_1to9_round PORT MAP( 
  encrypt => encrypt, 
  clk => clk, 
  reset => reset, 
  round_input => round_1_output, 
  roundkey => RoundKeySet(2), 
  round_output => round_2_output 





AES_1to9_round PORT MAP( 
  encrypt => encrypt, 
  clk => clk, 
  reset => reset, 
  round_input => round_2_output, 
  roundkey => RoundKeySet(3), 
  round_output => round_3_output 
  ); 
 
round_4:  
AES_1to9_round PORT MAP( 
  encrypt => encrypt, 
  clk => clk, 
  reset => reset, 
  round_input => round_3_output, 
  roundkey => RoundKeySet(4), 
  round_output => round_4_output 
  ); 
 
round_5:  
AES_1to9_round PORT MAP( 
  encrypt => encrypt, 
  clk => clk, 
  reset => reset, 
  round_input => round_4_output, 
  roundkey => RoundKeySet(5), 
  round_output => round_5_output 
  ); 
 
round_6:  
AES_1to9_round PORT MAP( 
  encrypt => encrypt, 
  clk => clk, 
  reset => reset, 
  round_input => round_5_output, 
  roundkey => RoundKeySet(6), 
  round_output => round_6_output 





AES_1to9_round PORT MAP( 
  encrypt => encrypt, 
  clk => clk, 
  reset => reset, 
  round_input => round_6_output, 
  roundkey => RoundKeySet(7), 
  round_output => round_7_output 
  ); 
 
round_8:  
AES_1to9_round PORT MAP( 
  encrypt => encrypt, 
  clk => clk, 
  reset => reset, 
  round_input => round_7_output, 
  roundkey => RoundKeySet(8), 
  round_output => round_8_output 
  ); 
 
round_9:  
AES_1to9_round PORT MAP( 
  encrypt => encrypt, 
  clk => clk, 
  reset => reset, 
  round_input => round_8_output, 
  roundkey => RoundKeySet(9), 
  round_output => round_9_output 
  ); 
 
--for last round ( round 10): compared with AES_1to9_round, no MixColumn operation. 
 
last_round:  
AES_last_round PORT MAP( 
  encrypt => encrypt, 
  clk => clk, 
  reset => reset, 
  last_round_input => round_9_output, 
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  roundkey => RoundKeySet(10), 
  last_round_output => last_round_output 



























-- Design Name:    AES-GCM 








entity AES_1to9_Round is 
port( 
 encrypt: in std_logic; 
 clk: in std_logic; 
 reset: in std_logic; 
 round_input: in std_logic_vector(0 to 127); 
 roundkey: in std_logic_vector(0 to 127); 
 round_output: out std_logic_vector(0 to 127) 
    ); 
end AES_1to9_Round; 
 
architecture structural of AES_1to9_Round is 
 
signal SubBytes_input, SubBytes_output: std_logic_vector(0 to 127); 
signal ShiftRows_input, ShiftRows_output: std_logic_vector(0 to 127); 
signal MixColumn_input, MixColumn_output: std_logic_vector(0 to 127); 
signal AddRoundKey_input, AddRoundKey_output: std_logic_vector(0 to 127); 




SubBytes_input <= round_input; 
ShiftRows_input <= SubBytes_output; 
MixColumn_input <= ShiftRows_output; 
AddRoundKey_input <= MixColumn_output; 
round_output <= AddRoundKey_output; 
 






if clk='1' and clk'event then 
for r in 0 to 15 loop 







ShiftRows: for r in 0 to 3 generate 
For_Column: for c in 0 to 3 generate 
ShiftRows_output(((r+4*((c+shiftNb(r))mod Nb))*8) to ((r+4*((c+shiftNb(r))mod Nb))*8+7)) 
<=ShiftRows_input(((r+4*c)*8) to ((r+4*c)*8+7)); 
end generate For_Column; 




MixColumn: for c in 0 to 3 generate 
 
MixColumn_output((0+4*c*8) to (7+4*c*8)) <= multiply_by_02(MixColumn_input((0+4*c*8) to (7+4*c*8)))  
            
  xor multiply_by_03(MixColumn_input((8+4*c*8) to (8+7+4*c*8)))  
            
  xor MixColumn_input((2*8+4*c*8) to (2*8+7+4*c*8))  
            
  xor MixColumn_input((3*8+4*c*8) to (3*8+7+4*c*8)); 
 
MixColumn_output((8+4*c*8) to (8+7+4*c*8)) <= MixColumn_input((0+4*c*8) to (7+4*c*8))  
            
  xor multiply_by_02(MixColumn_input((8+4*c*8) to (8+7+4*c*8)))  
            
  xor multiply_by_03(MixColumn_input((2*8+4*c*8) to (2*8+7+4*c*8)))  
            
  xor MixColumn_input((3*8+4*c*8) to (3*8+7+4*c*8)); 
 
MixColumn_output((2*8+4*c*8) to (2*8+7+4*c*8)) <= MixColumn_input((0+4*c*8) to (7+4*c*8))  
            
    xor MixColumn_input((8+4*c*8) to (8+7+4*c*8))  
            
    xor multiply_by_02(MixColumn_input((2*8+4*c*8) to (2*8+7+4*c*8)))  
            




MixColumn_output((3*8+4*c*8) to (3*8+7+4*c*8)) <= multiply_by_03(MixColumn_input((0+4*c*8) to (7+4*c*8)))  
            
      xor MixColumn_input((8+4*c*8) to (8+7+4*c*8))  
            
      xor MixColumn_input((2*8+4*c*8) to (2*8+7+4*c*8))  
            
      xor multiply_by_02(MixColumn_input((3*8+4*c*8) to (3*8+7+4*c*8))); 
 



































-- Design Name:    AES-GCM 








entity AES_last_round is 
port( 
 encrypt: in std_logic; 
 clk: in std_logic; 
 reset: in std_logic; 
 last_round_input: in std_logic_vector(0 to 127); 
 roundkey: in std_logic_vector(0 to 127); 
 last_round_output: out std_logic_vector(0 to 127) 
    ); 
end AES_last_round; 
 
architecture structural of AES_last_round is 
 
signal SubBytes_input, SubBytes_output: std_logic_vector(0 to 127); 
signal ShiftRows_input, ShiftRows_output: std_logic_vector(0 to 127); 




SubBytes_input <= last_round_input; 
ShiftRows_input <= SubBytes_output; 
AddRoundKey_input <= ShiftRows_output; 
last_round_output <= AddRoundKey_output; 
 




if clk='1' and clk'event then 
for r in 0 to 15 loop 
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ShiftRows: for r in 0 to 3 generate 
For_Column: for c in 0 to 3 generate 
ShiftRows_output(((r+4*((c+shiftNb(r))mod Nb))*8) to ((r+4*((c+shiftNb(r))mod Nb))*8+7)) 
<=ShiftRows_input(((r+4*c)*8) to ((r+4*c)*8+7)); 
end generate For_Column; 































-- Design Name:    AES-GCM 








entity Parallel_Multiplied_by_H is 
port( 
  clk: in std_logic;  
  reset: in std_logic; 
  H: in std_logic_vector(0 to 127);  
  AC: in std_logic_vector(0 to 127); 
  X: out std_logic_vector(0 to 127) 
  ); 
end Parallel_Multiplied_by_H; 
 
architecture structural of Parallel_Multiplied_by_H is 
 





variable temp: std_logic_vector(0 to 127); 





for i in 0 to 126 loop 
if MatrixU(i)(127)='0' then 
MatrixU(i+1) := rightshift(MatrixU(i)); 
else 






for k in 0 to 127 loop 
for l in 0 to 127 loop 








--if clk'event and clk='1' then 















Test-bench for the GCM module 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
-- Design Name:   AES-GCM 







ENTITY test_GCM_vhd IS 
END test_GCM_vhd; 
 
ARCHITECTURE behavior OF test_GCM_vhd IS  
 
 -- Component Declaration for the Unit Under Test (UUT) 
 COMPONENT gcm 
 PORT( 
  clk : IN std_logic; 
  reset : IN std_logic; 
  start_GCM : IN std_logic; 
  Encryption : IN std_logic; 
  H : IN std_logic_vector(0 to 127); 
  A_IV_P : IN std_logic_vector(0 to 127); 
  A_P_Len : IN std_logic_vector(31 downto 0);  
  T_Verification: out std_logic;          
  A_IV_C_T : OUT std_logic_vector(0 to 127); 
  data_valid : OUT std_logic 
  ); 
 END COMPONENT; 
 
 --Inputs 
 SIGNAL clk :  std_logic := '0'; 
 SIGNAL reset :  std_logic := '0'; 
 SIGNAL start_GCM :  std_logic := '0'; 
 SIGNAL Encryption :  std_logic := '0'; 
 signal T_Verification: std_logic; 
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 SIGNAL H :  std_logic_vector(0 to 127) := (others=>'0'); 
 SIGNAL A_IV_P :  std_logic_vector(0 to 127) := (others=>'0'); 
 SIGNAL A_P_Len :  std_logic_vector(31 downto 0) := (others=>'0'); 
 
 --Outputs 
 SIGNAL A_IV_C_T :  std_logic_vector(0 to 127); 
 SIGNAL data_valid :  std_logic; 




 -- Instantiate the Unit Under Test (UUT) 
 uut: GCM PORT MAP( 
  clk => clk, 
  start_GCM => start_GCM, 
  Encryption => Encryption, 
  reset => reset, 
  H => H, 
  A_IV_P => A_IV_P, 
  A_P_Len => A_P_Len, 
  T_Verification=>T_Verification, 
  A_IV_C_T => A_IV_C_T, 
  data_valid => data_valid 
 ); 
 
 clk <= not clk after 12 ns; 
 reset <= '1' after 3 ns, '0' after 43 ns; 
 start_GCM <= '1' after 56 ns; 
 Encryption <='0'; 
 A_P_Len <= X"00a001e0";    --X"00000200" for test case 3 ; --X"00a001e0" for test case 4 
 H <= X"B83B533708BF535D0AA6E52980D53B78"; 
 
 
 BT : PROCESS(clk) 
 BEGIN 
 if clk'event and clk='1' then 
 if reset='1' then 
 A_IV_P <= (others =>'0'); 
 count_b <=0; 





 if Encryption ='1' then 
  
-- if count_b=0 then 
-- A_IV_P <= X"cafebabefacedbaddecaf88800000001";   --use test case 3 
-- elsif count_b=1 then 
-- A_IV_P <= X"d9313225f88406e5a55909c5aff5269a"; 
-- elsif count_b=2 then 
-- A_IV_P <= X"86a7a9531534f7da2e4c303d8a318a72"; 
-- elsif count_b=3 then 
-- A_IV_P <= X"1c3c0c95956809532fcf0e2449a6b525"; 
-- else 
-- A_IV_P <= X"b16aedf5aa0de657ba637b391aafd255"; 
-- end if; 
 
 if count_b=0 then 
 A_IV_P <= X"feedfacedeadbeeffeedfacedeadbeef";     --use test case 4 
 elsif count_b=1 then 
 A_IV_P <= X"abaddad2000000000000000000000000"; 
 elsif count_b=2 then 
 A_IV_P <= X"cafebabefacedbaddecaf88800000001"; 
 elsif count_b=3 then 
 A_IV_P <= X"d9313225f88406e5a55909c5aff5269a"; 
 elsif count_b=4 then 
 A_IV_P <= X"86a7a9531534f7da2e4c303d8a318a72"; 
 elsif count_b=5 then 
 A_IV_P <= X"1c3c0c95956809532fcf0e2449a6b525"; 
 else 
 A_IV_P <= X"b16aedf5aa0de657ba637b3900000000"; 




-- if count_b=0 then 
-- A_IV_P <= X"cafebabefacedbaddecaf88800000001"; 
-- elsif count_b=1 then 
-- A_IV_P <= X"42831ec2217774244b7221b784d0d49c"; 
-- elsif count_b=2 then 
-- A_IV_P <= X"e3aa212f2c02a4e035c17e2329aca12e"; 
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-- elsif count_b=3 then 
-- A_IV_P <= X"21d514b25466931c7d8f6a5aac84aa05"; 
-- elsif count_b=4 then 
-- A_IV_P <= X"1ba30b396a0aac973d58e091473f5985"; 
-- else 
-- A_IV_P <= X"4d5c2af327cd64a62cf35abd2ba6fab4"; 
-- end if; 
  
 if count_b=0 then 
 A_IV_P <= X"feedfacedeadbeeffeedfacedeadbeef"; 
 elsif count_b=1 then 
 A_IV_P <= X"abaddad2000000000000000000000000"; 
 elsif count_b=2 then 
 A_IV_P <= X"cafebabefacedbaddecaf88800000001"; 
 elsif count_b=3 then 
 A_IV_P <= X"42831ec2217774244b7221b784d0d49c"; 
 elsif count_b=4 then 
 A_IV_P <= X"e3aa212f2c02a4e035c17e2329aca12e"; 
 elsif count_b=5 then 
 A_IV_P <= X"21d514b25466931c7d8f6a5aac84aa05"; 
 elsif count_b=6 then 
 A_IV_P <= X"1ba30b396a0aac973d58e09100000000"; 
 else 
 A_IV_P <= X"5bc94fbc3221a5db94fae95ae7121a47"; 
 end if; 
 end if; 
  
 if count_b/=31 then 
 count_b<=count_b+1; 
 end if; 
 end if; 
 end if; 







VHDL Codes of IPsec ESP Signal Generator 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
-- Design Name:    AES-GCM 







entity IPsec_Signal_Source is 
port( 
   clk: in std_logic; 
  reset: in std_logic;  
  start_GCM: out std_logic; 
  H: out std_logic_vector(0 to 127); 
   A_IV_P: out std_logic_vector(0 to 127); 








    clk: in std_logic; 
  reset: in std_logic;  
  start_LFSR: in std_logic; 
  LFSR_IV: in std_logic_vector(0 to 15); 
   LFSR_parallel_out: out std_logic_vector(0 to 15) 
  ); 
end component; 
 
--signal A_P_Len_1, A_P_Len_2, A_P_Len_3, A_P_Len_4: std_logic_vector(31 downto 0); 
 
signal Rem_128_A, Rem_128_P: integer range 0 to 127; 
signal Num_128_A, Num_128_P: integer range 0 to 511; 
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signal FIFO_Delay: integer range 0 to 15; 
signal Num_128_IV: integer range 0 to 1; 
signal Reg_Delay: integer range 0 to 1; 
signal Num_128_T: integer range 0 to 1; 
 
signal counter: integer range 0 to 1023; 
signal start_LFSR: std_logic; 
signal GCM_IV, LFSR_128bit: std_logic_vector(0 to 127); 
signal LFSR_IV: std_logic_vector(0 to 15); 
 
begin 
------Calculate Control parameter-------- 
 
Rem_128_A <= conv_integer(A_P_Len(22 downto 16));   -- indicate how many bits for last segment of A; 
Rem_128_P <= conv_integer(A_P_Len(6 downto 0));   -- indicate how many bits for last segment of P; 
 
process(A_P_Len, Rem_128_A, Rem_128_P) 
begin 
if Rem_128_A =0 then 
Num_128_A <= conv_integer(A_P_Len(31 downto 23)); 
else 
Num_128_A <= (conv_integer(A_P_Len(31 downto 23)) + 1); 
end if; 
if Rem_128_P =0 then 
Num_128_P <= conv_integer(A_P_Len(15 downto 7)); 
else 




FIFO_Delay <= 11;     -- 11 cycles delay for deleted bulb between A_IV and C;  
Num_128_IV <= 1;     -- at here, We only choose IV is 96-bit long, so Num_128_IV = 1; 
Reg_Delay <= 1;   -- 1 cycles delay for deleted bulb between C and T; 






if clk'event and clk='1' then    
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if reset ='1' then 
counter <=0; 




if counter =0 or counter = (Num_128_A+1)  






if counter = (Num_128_A+Num_128_IV+Num_128_P+Num_128_T+FIFO_Delay+FIFO_Delay+3) then 
start_GCM <='0'; 
counter <= 0;  
else 
start_GCM <='1'; 







process(start_LFSR, GCM_IV,LFSR_128bit ) 
begin 
if start_LFSR ='0' then 
A_IV_P <= GCM_IV; 
else  





 port map( 
    clk=>clk, 
  reset=>reset, 
  start_LFSR=>start_LFSR, 
  LFSR_IV=>LFSR_IV, 
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 port map( 
    clk=>clk, 
  reset=>reset, 
  start_LFSR=>start_LFSR, 
  LFSR_IV=>LFSR_IV, 




 port map( 
    clk=>clk, 
  reset=>reset, 
  start_LFSR=>start_LFSR, 
  LFSR_IV=>LFSR_IV, 




 port map( 
    clk=>clk, 
  reset=>reset, 
  start_LFSR=>start_LFSR, 
  LFSR_IV=>LFSR_IV, 




 port map( 
    clk=>clk, 
  reset=>reset, 
  start_LFSR=>start_LFSR, 
  LFSR_IV=>LFSR_IV, 







 port map( 
    clk=>clk, 
  reset=>reset, 
  start_LFSR=>start_LFSR, 
  LFSR_IV=>LFSR_IV, 




 port map( 
    clk=>clk, 
  reset=>reset, 
  start_LFSR=>start_LFSR, 
  LFSR_IV=>LFSR_IV, 




 port map( 
    clk=>clk, 
  reset=>reset, 
  start_LFSR=>start_LFSR, 
  LFSR_IV=>LFSR_IV, 




H <= X"B83B533708BF535D0AA6E52980D53B78"; 














-- Design Name:    AES-GCM 







entity LFSR_16bit is 
port( 
    clk: in std_logic; 
  reset: in std_logic;  
  start_LFSR: in std_logic; 
  LFSR_IV: in std_logic_vector(0 to 15); 
   LFSR_parallel_out: out std_logic_vector(0 to 15) 
  ); 
end LFSR_16bit; 
 
architecture Behavioral of LFSR_16bit is 
 






if clk'event and clk='1' then 
if reset='0' and start_LFSR='1'then 
 
for i in 0 to 14 loop 
LFSR(i+1) <= LFSR(i); 
end loop; 
LFSR(0) <= LFSR(15) xnor LFSR(14) xnor LFSR(12) xnor LFSR(3);    --from Xilinx; 
 
--for i in 0 to 14 loop 
--LFSR(i) <= LFSR(i+1); 
--end loop; 


















The Critical Path on GCM module 
 
========================================================================= 
Timing constraint: Default period analysis for Clock 'clk' 
  Clock period: 13.213ns (frequency: 75.683MHz) 
  Total number of paths / destination ports: 31206775 / 2976 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Delay:               13.213ns (Levels of Logic = 20) 
  Source:            A_P_Len_1_24 (FF) 
  Destination:       A_IV_C_T_9 (FF) 
  Source Clock:      clk rising 
  Destination Clock: clk rising 
 
  Data Path: A_P_Len_1_24 to A_IV_C_T_9 
                                Gate     Net 
    Cell:in->out      fanout   Delay   Delay  Logical Name (Net Name) 
    ----------------------------------------  ------------ 
     FDE:C->Q              7   0.374   0.690  A_P_Len_1_24 (A_P_Len_1_24) 
     LUT1_L:I0->LO         1   0.313   0.000  A_P_Len_1_24_rt (A_P_Len_1_24_rt) 
     MUXCY:S->O            1   0.377   0.000  gcm__n0315<1>cy (gcm__n0315<1>_cyo) 
     MUXCY:CI->O           1   0.042   0.000  gcm__n0315<2>cy (gcm__n0315<2>_cyo) 
     MUXCY:CI->O           1   0.042   0.000  gcm__n0315<3>cy (gcm__n0315<3>_cyo) 
     MUXCY:CI->O           1   0.042   0.000  gcm__n0315<4>cy (gcm__n0315<4>_cyo) 
     MUXCY:CI->O           1   0.042   0.000  gcm__n0315<5>cy (gcm__n0315<5>_cyo) 
     XORCY:CI->O           4   0.868   0.514  gcm__n0315<6>_xor (_n0315<6>) 
     LUT3_L:I2->LO         1   0.313   0.000  Num_128_A<6>11 (N1283) 
     MUXCY:S->O            1   0.377   0.000  gcm__n1241<6>cy (gcm__n1241<6>_cyo) 
     XORCY:CI->O          10   0.868   0.744  gcm__n1241<7>_xor (_n1241<7>) 
     LUT1_L:I0->LO         1   0.313   0.000  _n1241<7>_rt1 (_n1241<7>_rt1) 
     MUXCY:S->O            1   0.377   0.000  gcm__n0312<7>cy (gcm__n0312<7>_cyo) 
     XORCY:CI->O           2   0.868   0.473  gcm__n0312<8>_xor (_n0312<8>) 
     LUT4_L:I2->LO         1   0.313   0.000  gcm__n0331<8>lut (N368) 
     MUXCY:S->O            1   0.377   0.000  gcm__n0331<8>cy (gcm__n0331<8>_cyo) 
     XORCY:CI->O           1   0.868   0.533  gcm__n0331<9>_xor (_n0331<9>) 
     LUT2_L:I0->LO         1   0.313   0.000  XNor_stagelut147 (N412) 
     MUXCY:S->O            1   0.377   0.000  XNor_stagecy_rn_146 
(XNor_stage_cyo144) 
     MUXCY:CI->O         142   0.525   1.024  XNor_stagecy_rn_147 (_n0628) 
     LUT4:I3->O           10   0.313   0.601  _n09531_13 (_n09531_12) 
     FDE:CE                    0.335          A_IV_C_T_90 
    ---------------------------------------- 
    Total                     13.213ns (8.635ns logic, 4.579ns route) 















Timing constraint: Default OFFSET IN BEFORE for Clock 'clk' 
  Total number of paths / destination ports: 124379 / 1509 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Offset:              10.231ns (Levels of Logic = 12) 
  Source:            H<127> (PAD) 
  Destination:       A_IV_C_T_11 (FF) 
  Destination Clock: clk rising 
 
  Data Path: H<127> to A_IV_C_T_11 
                                Gate     Net 
    Cell:in->out      fanout   Delay   Delay  Logical Name (Net Name) 
    ----------------------------------------  ------------ 
     IBUF:I->O           268   0.919   1.327  H_127_IBUF (H_127_IBUF) 
     begin scope: 'Multiplier128x128' 
     LUT2:I0->O           16   0.313   0.884  _n0002<120>1 (_n20873<119>) 
     LUT4:I0->O            6   0.313   0.667  _n0365<120>1 (_n21979<119>) 
     LUT2:I0->O            1   0.313   0.533  _n205701 (_n20777<127>) 
     LUT4:I0->O            1   0.313   0.440  Mxor__n3592_inst_lut4_41271 
(Mxor__n3592__net31) 
     LUT4:I3->O            1   0.313   0.440  Mxor__n3592_inst_lut4_41351 
(Mxor__n3592__net40) 
     LUT4:I3->O            1   0.313   0.506  Mxor__n3592_inst_lut4_41371 
(Mxor__n3592__net43) 
     LUT2:I1->O            3   0.313   0.495  Mxor__n3592_inst_lut2_01 (X<11>) 
     end scope: 'Multiplier128x128' 
     LUT4:I2->O            1   0.313   0.440  _n1230<3>441_SW0_SW0 (N3537) 
     LUT4_L:I3->LO         1   0.313   0.216  
Mmux_Mux2out_Mux2out<112>_Mux2out<112>_rn_5111_SW0 (N3104) 
     LUT4_L:I1->LO         1   0.313   0.000  
Mmux_Mux2out_Mux2out<112>_Mux2out<112>_rn_5111 (Mux3out<11>) 
     FDE:D                     0.234          A_IV_C_T_11 
    ---------------------------------------- 
    Total                     10.231ns (4.283ns logic, 5.948ns route) 






Glossary of Terms and Acronyms 
The following definitions are used throughout this Thesis: 
GCM The forth recommendation of symmetric block cipher mode of operation SP800-38D, 
Galois/Counter Mode of Operation 
NIST The National Institute of Standards and Technology 
ECB Electronic Codebook mode, the one of five confidentiality modes of operation recommended 
by NIST for use with an underlying symmetric key block cipher algorithm  
CBC Cipher Block Chaining mode mode, the one of five confidentiality modes of operation 
recommended by NIST for use with an underlying symmetric key block cipher algorithm 
CFB Cipher Feedback mode, the one of five confidentiality modes of operation recommended by 
NIST for use with an underlying symmetric key block cipher algorithm 
OFB Output Feedback mode, the one of five confidentiality modes of operation recommended by 
NIST for use with an underlying symmetric key block cipher algorithm 
CTR Counter mode, the one of five confidentiality modes of operation recommended by NIST for 
use with an underlying symmetric key block cipher algorithm 
MAC Message Authentication Code 
AES Advanced Encryption Standard 
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard 
FPGA Field Programmable Gate Array 
GF Galois Field 
CMC Canadian Microelectronics Corporation 
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PLB IBM Processor Local Bus 
OPB  IBM On-Chip Peripheral Bus 
SoC  System on a Chip 
ESP  IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload 
FSM  Finite State Machine 
MGT  Multi-Gigabit Transciever 
IV  Initialization Vector 
P  Plaintext 
AAD  Additional Authenticated Data, also denoted as A. 
C  Ciphertext 
T  Authentication Tag 
GHASH The specified universal hash function in GCM is defined over a binary Galois 
field and is a 128-bit polynomial multiplier over GF (2128) which can provide 
an authentication mechanism.  
GCTR For the confidentiality mechanism of GCM, the CTR mode embedded by 
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